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WHY PROTECT PRIVATE ARMS POSSESSION? NINE
THEORIES OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT
Michael Steven Green*
INTRODUCTION

The Second Amendment to the United States Constitution reads:
"A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free
State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be
infringed." 1 Until recently, federal courts adopted a "collective-right"
interpretation of the Amendment. 2 According to this interpretation,
the Second Amendment's scope is limited by its prefatory clause: the
people have a right to bear arms only insofar as it contributes to a
"well regulated Militia." Furthermore, the term "Militia" refers to
organized state militias, whose only modern equivalent is the National
Guard.
Under the collective-right interpretation, the Second Amendment protects the interests of state governments, not individuals. For
this reason, only regulations of firearms that impair states' abilities to
arm their militias can be unconstitutional. 3 No challenged regulation
has ever come close to this threshold.
©
2008 Michael Steven Green. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may
reproduce and distribute copies of this Article in any format, at or below cost, for
educational purposes, so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to
the Notre Dame Law Review, and includes this provision and copyright notice.
* Professor of Law, College of William & Mary. Ph.D. (Philosophy), Yale
University, 1990;J.D., Yale Law School, 1996. I would like to thank an audience at the
University of Pennsylvania Law School, and especially Matt Adler and Stephen Perry,
for comments on an earlier incarnation of this paper. Thanks also to Nelson Lund,
Bill Van Alstyne, Jim Dwyer, Nate Oman, Torben Spaak, and an audience at the
Faculty of Law of the University of Uppsala, Sweden for helpful comments on more
recent drafts.
1 U.S. CaNST. amend. II.
2 See, e.g., Gillespie v. City of Indianapolis, 185 F.3d 693, 710 (7th Cir. 1999);
United States v. Hale, 978 F.2d 1016, 1020 (8th Cir. 1993). As we shall see, the choice
of the term "collective right" is unfortunate. See infra Part II.A.
3 Indeed, the Ninth Circuit took the collective-right interpretation to what
would appear to be its logical conclusion, ruling that individuals have no standing to
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District of Columbia v. Heller4 changed all that. The Supreme
Court, in an opinion authored by Justice Scalia, held that the Second
Amendment protects an individual right to bear arms for purposes
unrelated to state militia service, including personal self-defense, and
struck down two gun control laws on the ground that they violated this
individual right. 5 The District of Columbia's prohibition on most private ownership of handguns was unconstitutional because it banned a
class of arms that "is overwhelmingly chosen by American society for
[self-defense] ." 6 Its requirement that other firearms be kept disassembled or bound by a trigger lock or similar device that would render
them incapable of immediate use was struck down because the law
made it "impossible for citizens to use them for the core lawful purpose of self-defense." 7
This Article will not discuss the textual and historical arguments
Scalia offered in favor of his reading. I will assume that the Second
Amendment protects an individual right to bear arms. At the same
time, I will not address the normative question of whether the Second
Amendment would exist in an ideal world-that is, whether individuals' interests in arms possession truly merit constitutional protection.
The method of this Article can best be described as normative reasoning under constraint. Assuming that there should be an individual
constitutional right to bear arms, what are the best normative arguments available in favor of this conclusion? What are the most plausible individual interests in private arms possession that such a right
would protect?
Such an inquiry would not be necessary if Scalia had provided a
detailed account of these interests himself. To be sure, his opinion is
challenge federal regulation of firearms on Second Amendment grounds. See Silveira
v. Lockyer, 312 F.3d 1052, 1066-67 (9th Cir. 2002).
4 District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008). The decision in Heller
was influenced by vigorous academic attacks on the collective-right interpretation
over the past two decades, sometimes from surprising comers. See Akhil Reed Amar,
The Bill of Rights As a Constitution, 100 YALE LJ. 1131, 1162-73 (1991); Don B. Kates,
Jr., Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the Second Amendment, 82 MicH. L.
REv. 204, 214-20 (1983); Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99
YALE LJ. 637, 643-57 (1989); Nelson Lund, The Past and Future of the Individual's Right
to Bear Arms, 31 GA. L. REv. 1, 25-26 (1996); William Van Alstyne, The Second Amendment and the Personal Right to Anns, 43 DuKE LJ. 1236, 1254 (1994); Eugene Volokh,
The Commonplace Second Amendment, 73 N.Y.U. L. REv. 793, 812-13 (1998).
5 Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2797-98.
6 !d. at 2817 (striking down D.C. CooE § 7-2502.02(a)(4) (2001)); see also id. at
2818 (describing the handgun as the "quintessential self-defense weapon").
7

!d. at 2818 (striking down D.C. CoDE§ 7-2507.02 (2001)).
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peppered with references to the "natural" 8 or "inherent" 9 right of selfdefense. But he does not say why the natural right to self-defense
exists or how it grounds a right to bear arms.
Indeed, Scalia fails to answer what is surely the most fundamental
question about the right to bear arms, namely whether it exists
because it contributes to our safety. Granted, when I use arms in justifiable self-defense against a violent intruder, that act makes me safer.
But a system of private arms possession, in which others (including
the intruder himself) also possess arms, might increase my vulnerability to violence. Is Scalia saying that the Founders rejected this possibility? Was the Second Amendment enacted because a system of private
arms possession was thought to make citizens safer than one in which
they were disarmed? Or did they think individuals have some autonomy interest in arms possession worth protecting even in the face of
increased violence? And if the Second Amendment does protect an
autonomy interest, what is this interest? As we shall see, this matter is
far more complicated than it might at first appear.
In this Article, I will seek to identify the most plausible interests in
private arms possession that might stand behind the Second Amendment, even if these interests would not justify the decision in Heller.
For example, one possible justification for the Second Amendment is
that it protects our democratic institutions by empowering citizens to
rebel by force of arms against a tyrannical minority. Although this
justification can explain why individuals, and not merely states, have
Second Amendment rights, it fails to explain the result in Heller, since
it gives us no reason to believe that individuals have constitutionally
protected interests in the use of arms in self-defense against private
violence .1 0
I will concentrate, however, on interests that could justify the Heller decision. Indeed, an ideal account would justify, not merely the
result in Heller, but the other claims that Scalia made, in dicta, about
the scope of the Second Amendment. Most significantly, he argued
that individuals have a constitutionally protected interest only in bearing arms "typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful pur-

8 /d. at 2838 (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *139); id. at 2809
(quoting Nunn v. State, 1 Ga. 243, 251 (1846)); see also id. at 2805 (quoting ST.
GEORGE TucKER, View of the Constitution of the United States, in 1 BLACKSTONE's CoMMENTARIES app. at 300 (St. George Tucker ed., Phila., William Busch Young & Abraham
Small 1803) ("[T]he right to self-defense is the first law of nature.")).
9
10

!d. at 2817.
See infra Part Il.A.
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poses," 11 a principle that would exclude "dangerous and unusual
weapons" such as machine guns. 12 The closest I will come to such an
ideal account is the argument that the Second Amendment protects
bearing arms in self-defense, not as a means of making us safer from
violence, but out of respect for Lockean values of autonomy and
individualism.
Once again, I offer these arguments not as a defender of the Second Amendment, but rather as a defender of principled reasoning
about questions of constitutional law. Sensitivity to the variety of possible interests protected by the Second Amendment is essential to any
intellectually responsible discussion of the topic. This is true even if
one seeks solely to discern the Founders' intent. Unless one is aware
of all the reasons they may have thought private arms possession was
worthy of constitutional protection, one stands the chance of overlooking their actual reasons.
Clarity about the Second Amendment's purposes is particularly
important when deciding questions of scope unanswered by Heller.
Consider, for example, the appropriate standard of review for laws
that infringe upon protected Second Amendment interests-a matter
that Scalia left open in his opinion. 13 Should the standard be strict
scrutiny, 14 which upholds such laws only if they are justified by a compelling governmental interest and are narrowly tailored to further
that interest? 15 In free speech contexts, whether strict or intermediate
scrutiny is chosen depends upon the strength of the interest at issue.
Laws that burden commercial speech, for example, get intermediate
scrutiny because the interests standing behind such speech are less
significant.I 6 We cannot figure out which standard of review the Sec11 Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2816. He derives this limitation from United States v. Miller,
307 u.s. 174, 179 (1939).
12 Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2817.
13 See id. at 2817-18.
14 See, e.g., United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000).
15 See ERWIN CHEMERJNSKY, CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw 519-20 (2002). Such a standard
might threaten laws prohibiting convicted felons from possessing firearms. Scalia
claimed, in dicta, that "nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt" on such
laws. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2816-17. But even if one assumes that the considerations of
public safety that motivate them are compelling, they appear seriously overinclusive,
since many felonies (such as white-collar crimes) do not suggest a tendency to gun
violence. See Adam Winkler, Scrutinizing the Second Amendment, 105 MicH. L. REv. 638,
721 (2007).
16 See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 455-56 (1978). Under intermediate scrutiny, a law infringing upon a protected interest is constitutional if it is
justified by an important governmental interest and is substantially related to that
interest. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 220 (1995).
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ond Amendment deserves without a theory of the interests it
protects. 17
Another question of scope left unanswered by Heller is whether
the Second Amendment should be incorporated into the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause and applied to the states. Incorporation has been held to apply only to those provisions in the Bill of
Rights that are "fundamental to the American scheme of justice." 18
For example, the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial was held to be
17 Another possibility is a reasonableness standard of review, similar to that
applied in Fourth Anlendment contexts. Under the Fourth Anlendment, an invasion
of privacy can be constitutionally permissible even if it is only roughly tailored to a
governmemal interest, and even if that interest is something less than compelling,
provided that the invasion is reasonable-a matter that is determined "by balancing
[the] intrusion on the individual's Fourth Anlendment interests against [the] promotion of legitimate governmental interests." Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S.
646, 652-53 (1995); see also Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 629
n.9 (1989) ("The reasonableness of any particular government activity does not necessarily or invariably turn on the existence of alternative 'less intrusive' means." (citing
Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 647 (1983))).
A reasonableness standard should be distinguished from a rational basis standard. Under the latter, a law would be upheld if it is a rational means of furthering
some legitimate governmental interest. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 54-55 (1973). The existence of a governmental interest supporting the law is all that matters-this interest is not balanced against some
constitutionally protected interest of the individual. The rational basis test is used in
Equal Protection cases when the challenged governmental action does not implicate a
protected class or fundamental right. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996).
As Scalia notes, a rational basis standard of review for the Second Anlendment would
provide arms possession with no greater protection than it would have in the absence
of the Second Anlendment. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2817-18 n.27.
The court of appeals in Heller and many Second Anlendment advocates appear to
adopt a reasonableness standard. They claim, for example, that the right to bear
arms can be subject to reasonable regulation in the interest of public safety. See, e.g.,
Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 398-400 (D.C. Cir. 2007), affd sub nom.
District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008); United States v. Emerson, 270
F.3d 203, 261-65 (5th Cir. 2001); Randy E. Barnett & Don B. Kates, Jr., Under Fire: The
New Consensus on the Second Amendment, 45 EMORY LJ. 1139, 1190 (1986); Charles J.
Dunlap, Jr., Revolt of the Masses: Armed Civilians and the Insurrectionary Theory of the Second Amendment, 62 TENN. L. REv. 643,677 (1995) ("[The Second Anlendment] should
be subject to the same balancing test that has been successfully used in reconciling
conflicting interests with respect to other amendments."); Don B. Kates, Jr., The Second Amendment: A Dialogue, LAw & CoNTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1986, at 143, 145-46;
Lund, supra note 4, at 49 (explaining that the Second Anlendment requires "balancing individual liberty against public safety"); Van Alstyne, supra note 4, at 1253-54.
But see Winkler, supra note 15, at 691-93 (discussing strict scrutiny language used in
United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203 (5th Cir. 2001), and by some Second Anlendment advocates).
18 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).
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incorporated because it was a "fundamental right" 19 that protected
criminal defendants' interests in a fair and unbiased trial. 20 Once
again, we cannot know whether the Second Amendment deserves the
same treatment without a theory of the interests it protects. Although
I will not seek to resolve these important problems of the Second
Amendment's scope in this Article, the interests in private arms possession that I identify must form the basis of any resolution.
In his opinion, Scalia did not merely state that individuals have
an interest in private arms possession. He described them as having a
natural right to bear arms, a right that preexisted the enactment of
the Second Amendment. 21 This natural right would have limited the
government's authority even if the Founders had failed to recognize it
in the Constitution. 22 In keeping with Scalia's account, the justifications I describe will generally seek to explain how the interests individuals have in private arms possession are sufficiently fundamental to
limit the authority of the government.
In many cases, these justifications will rely on Lockean arguments
about the limits of governmental authority. 23 For Locke, the source of
the government's authority is the consent of the governed, and the
limits of this authority are determined by the scope of that consent. It
is useful to discuss the Second Amendment in the context of Locke's
theory of political authority, because it was popular among the Founders.24 But because many today no longer accept this theory, I will
also attempt to outline how such justifications might fare under theories that do not take political authority to depend upon consent.

Id. at 158.
Id. at 156.
21 Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2797.
22 To be sure, he also speaks of the Second Amendment as codifYing a preexisting legal right created by the English Bill of Rights. Id. at 2797-2800. But Scalia
quotes favorably views that this English right was grounded in a natural right. Id. at
2799 ("It is a natural right which the people have reserved to themselves, confirmed
by the Bill of Rights, to keep arms for their own defence." (quoting Journal of Occurrences: March 17, N.Y.]., Apr. 13, 1769, at supp. 2) ); id. at 2798; see also David B. Kopel,
The Natural Right of Self-Defense: Heller's Lesson for the World, 58 SYRAcusE L. REv. (forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at 1), available at http:/ /ssm.com/abstract=1172255.
23 See joHN LocKE, THE SECOND TREATJSE ON CIVJL GovERNMENT (Prometheus
Books 1986) (1690).
24 See BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
182-87 (1967); LEONARD W. LEW, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE fRAMERS' CONSTITUTION
139 (1988); GoRDoN S. WooD, THE RADICAUSM OF THE Al\1ERICAN REvoLUTION 164-66
(1992).
19

20
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JusTIFICATIONS BASED ON SELF-DEFENSE

As we have seen, Scalia understood the Second Amendment as
protecting "an individual right to use arms for self-defense." 25 But the
question remains why such an individual right exists. What is the
value to individuals of bearing arms in self-defense?

A.

Public Safety

The first and most straightforward argument is that allowing individuals to possess arms for use in Uustifiable) self-defense increases
the likelihood that innocent life will be preserved. Since each of us
has an interest in preserving his innocent life, we have an interest in
private arms possession, an interest that is sufficiently fundamental to
limit the authority of the government. 26 It is not within the power
even of a democratically elected government to undermine an individual's interest in the safety from harm that private arms possession
brings.
The first justification is unique among those discussed in this Article in claiming that a system of private arms possession makes us safer
from violence at the hands of our fellow citizens. As we shall see, the
remaining justifications do not demand that it have this beneficial
effect.
Scalia never explicitly endorses the first justification. To be sure,
he speaks of the usefulness of arms, and particularly of handguns,
when engaging in justifiable self-defense. 27 But even if I am made
safer with respect to a fixed population by possessing a gun, 28 it does
not follow that a system in which citizens are generally allowed to own
arms for self-defense will make me safer than one in which we are all
disarmed.
Possessing a gun can expose others to risks of harm. These risks
include the possibilities: (1) that the owner will use his gun to commit
25 Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2811.
26 For possible examples of this argument, see Samuel C. Wheeler III, Self-Defense:
Rights and Coerced Risk-Acceptance, 11 Pus. Arr. Q. 431 ( 1997); Jeffrey Snyder, Fighting
Back: Crime, Self-Defense, and the Right to Carry a Handgun (Oct. 22, 1997), http:/ I
www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=ll43 ("[C]itizens have the right to defend
themselves against criminal attack. And since criminals can strike almost anywhere at
any time, the last thing government ought to be doing is stripping citizens of the most
effective means of defending themselves.").
27 Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2818-20.
28 This might be doubted. Some of the risks that gun possession creates for the
gun's owner are the possibilities: (1) that he might use it to commit suicide; (2) that
. he might harm himself accidentally; or (3) that an assailant (or a child) might take his
gun and use it against him.
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a crime (including a crime of passion against a spouse or family member); (2) that he might use the gun in a mistaken act of self-defense;
and (3) that he might accidentally discharge the gun, harming someone.29 The mutual imposition of these risks of harm might collectively render us less safe compared to compelled disarmament. In
short, allowing private arms possession might put citizens in a prisoner's dilemma. The choice to arm dominates, in the sense that it is
in one's interest to arm oneself, whether or not others do so as well.
But when everyone makes the same choice, the mutually imposed
risks of harm make us all worse off. 30
1.

Does a System of Private Arms Possession Make Us Safer?

Much debate over the Second Amendment has revolved around
this empirical question of the effects of a system of private arms possession on public safety. 31 If the government's choice were simply
between successful disarmament and uncontrolled individual arms
possession, it is very likely that the former would make citizens safer.
But the matter is more complicated, because the government's choice
is not between these two strategies. First of all, the government's policy of disarmament might be only partially successful. Indeed, it
might predominantly affect law-abiding citizens, who would use arms
in justified self-defense, without affecting the use of arms by criminals.
The D.C. Circuit, whose decision was affirmed by the Supreme Court
in Heller, suggested that this is true, at least in the District of
Columbia:
As amici point out, and as D.C. judges are well aware, the black
market for handguns in the District is so strong that handguns are
readily available (probably at little premium) to criminals. It is
29 For a discussion of these risks, see Guns in the Home, http:/ /www.bradycampaign.org/facts/issues/?page=home (April 2002) (last visited Sept. 18, 2008).
30 Arms races between nations are routinely modeled as prisoner's dilemmas, so
it should not be odd to understand individuals' decisions to arm analogously. See
Russell Hardin, Unilateral Versus Mutual Disarmament, 12 PHIL & Pus. AFF. 236, 248
(1983).
31 Compare Barnett & Kates, supra note 17, at 1234-59 (arguing that the "more
guns = more murders" assertion is empirically disproven), and John R. Lott, Jr. &
David B. Mustard, Crime, Deterrence, and Right-to-Carry Concealed Handguns, 26 J. LEGAL
STUo. 1, 64-65 (1997) ("[C]oncealed handguns are the most cost-effective method of
reducing crime .... "), with Guns in the Home, supra note 29 ("[G]uns kept in the
home for self-protection are more often used to kill somebody you know than to kill
in self-defense . . . . "). This debate is well described in Justice Breyer's dissent in
Heller. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2832-36 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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asserted, therefore, that the D.C. gun control laws irrationally prevent only law abiding citizens from owning handguns. 32
Second, the government does not have to allow uncontrolled
individual arms possession. It can regulate, at least to some extent,
who may own firearms, which firearms may be owned, and how they
are used-thereby increasing the use of arms in justified self-defense
and decreasing accidental and intentional misuse of arms.
It is possible, therefore, that a system of private arms possession
would make us safer than disarmament. It is worth noting, however,
that even if it does makes us safer, this is true within a particular context, which might change. For example, if a policy of disarmament
currently undermines public safety because the government is unable
to effectively disarm criminals, the technological, legal, or political
causes of this inability might later be overcome. One possible criticism of the first justification, therefore, is that if private arms possession makes us safer, this fact is too contingent upon present
circumstances to justifY anything as enduring as a constitutional right.
If Private Arms Possession Makes Us Safer, Does That Mean It Is
Beyond the Government's Authority to Disarm Us?

2.

Furthermore, even if it is true that a system of private arms possession makes us safer, that does not mean that the government would be
acting outside its authority if it disarmed the population. One cannot
assume that the government has exceeded its authority simply because
it has made a mistake. An essential element of the government's
authority is its ability to require a citizen to obey its decisions even if
they are wrong. 3 3 If the government's decisions were binding only if
they were the best available, governmental authority would evaporate,
since citizens would take themselves to have a reason to conform to a
governmental decision only when they thought it was the best available and so would have conformed even in the absence of the decision.
They would, in effect, be free of a duty of obedience, able to enforce
their own views about the scope of people's rights and duties.
This is not to say that governmental authority over individuals
must be unlimited. The government, we can assume, is not free to
make mistakes concerning the fundamental interests of individuals,
such as whether free speech should be suppressed or cruel and unusual punishments imposed. But it must be allowed to make some mis32
33

Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 399 n.l7 (D.C. Cir. 2007) .
See, e.g., Philip Soper, Legal Theory and the Claim of Authority, in THE DuTY TO
OBEY THE LAw 21 3, 222 (William A. Edmundson ed., 1999) ("The typical claim of the
legal authority is that directions are to be followed even if they are wrong . . . .").
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takes, and the question remains why disarmament is not one of those
areas where governmental mistakes are permissible.
The reason cannot simply be that our interest in safety is so significant that governmental decisions that impact it cannot be mistaken.
One problem with such an argument is that if private arms possession
makes us less safe, as many people believe, it would be beyond the
government's authority to fail to disarm the population. My guess is
that few defenders of the Second Amendment would concede that if
they are wrong about the beneficial effects of private arms possession,
a constitutional amendment requiring disarmament would be necessary. What is more, the government routinely makes decisions-for
example, concerning the distribution of police protection or when to
go to war-that have profound consequences for our safety. And yet
we consider ourselves obligated to accept these decisions even if they
are mistaken.
Of course, even if the government does not act beyond its authority simply by making a mistake concerning public safety, it would surely
be acting beyond its authority if it failed to provide citizens with a
minimal level of safety. Locke thought that individuals had an inalienable right to a certain level of security from harm. It was not within
the power of one submitting to governmental authority to give over to
the government the right to make any decision it wants concerning
his safety. 34 No one can consent to be a slave, that is, someone who
may be killed, or left to be killed, at will. 35 In particular, no one could
consent to receive a level of security inferior to that experienced in
the state of nature (that is, in the absence of governmental authority) .36 Mter all, one leaves the state of nature and consents to governmental authority to escape the violence and feuding of private
enforcement of rights, 37 and "no rational creature can be supposed to
change his condition with an intention to be worse." 38
34 See LocKE, supra note 23, § 131, at 71-72.
35 See id. § 23, at 18.
36 See id. § 137, at 76 ("It cannot be supposed that [people] should intend ... to
give any one or more an absolute arbitrary power over their persons and estates ... ;
this were to put themselves into a worse position than the state of Nature, wherein
they had a liberty to defend their right against the injuries of others .... "); see also A.
joHN SIMMONS, ON THE EDGE OF ANARcHY 50 (1993) ("Despotical power cannot be
acquired by compact.").
37 See infra Part I.D.l.
38 LocKE, supra note 23, § 131, at 71-72. Locke's inalienability argument appears
to appeal to the fact that it would be irrational to consent to be a slave. But Locke
offers another argument that voluntary slavery is impossible, namely because
"[n]obody can give more power than he has himself, and he that cannot take away his
own life cannot give another power over it." /d. § 22, at 18. I cannot give someone
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Could one argue that individuals have a right to bear arms
because the government, by disarming us, would be failing to provide
us with this minimal level of protection? One problem with this argument is that even if the government makes us less safe by disarming
us, it does not follow that our total level of protection from violence
would be inadequate. The government might still be providing us
with the level of protection that is our right (for example, by stationing a policeman on every block). For such an argument to work,
therefore, one would have to show not merely that private arms possession makes us safer, but that its contribution to our safety is so
profound that the government can provide us with the minimal level
of security that is our right only if it allows us to be armed. That is an
impossibly tall order.
It is important to distinguish the first justification from another,
which we will discuss later, that assumes that the government has
already failed to provide us with the minimal level of personal security
that is our right. 39 As we shall see, one advantage of this later justification (our fifth) is that the government's failure can ground a right to
bear arms whether or not arms make us safer. Once the government
violates its obligations to provide security, we return to the state of
nature, freeing us to use arms to protect ourselves despite any costs to
our safety that private arms possession generates. But we are currently
considering an argument that is different in two crucial respects from
the fifth: ( 1) it claims that the government can remain within the limits of its authority by giving us a right to bear arms, not that we have
such a right because the government has lost its authority over us; and
(2) it grounds the right to bear arms in the contribution that arms
make to our safety, rather than claiming that we have such a right
whether or not we are made safer as a result.
A final reason that the public safety benefits of private arms possession might justify a right to bear arms is that governmental decisions concerning public safety that are manifestly wrong are beyond the
government's authority, even when the government is providing indithe right to kill me arbitrarily, not because I have the right to kill myself arbitrarily
that I cannot alienate, but simply because I have no right to kill myself arbitrarily to
begin with. For a further discussion of this argument, see A. John Simmons, Inalienable Rights and Locke's Treatises, 12 PHIL. & Pus. AFF. 175, 197-98 (1983).
Of course, many modern philosophers reject consent theories of political obligation. See infra notes 109-12 and accompanying text. But even these philosophers see
political authority as limited by certain fundamental interests of individuals. These
would presumably include an interest in a certain minimal level of security.

39

See infra Part I.E.l.
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viduals with the level of security that is their right. A law prohibiting
arms possession might be such a manifest error.
The idea that manifest errors are beyond the government's
authority would not lead governmental authority to evaporate. It is
true that I have not submitted to the government's authority if I
reserve the right to reject its decisions whenever they are wrong. But
refusing to submit to manifestly wrong decisions is not the same as
refusing to submit to wrong decisions. 40 It is compatible with the government's authority to regulate farm production, for example, that
farmers would not be bound by a regulation compelling them to sow
their fields with stones rather than seeds.
A limitation on governmental authority for manifest errors might
explain why individuals have a fundamental interest in self-defense (as
distinguished from a fundamental interest in bearing arms for selfdefense). Many people, including Locke, have argued that the government cannot permissibly prohibit citizens from engaging in selfdefense in cases of imminent violence. 41 One reason for this limit on
the authority of the state may be that the public safety benefits of selfdefense are so manifest. 42
It certainly seems that the prohibition of some acts of self-defense
would manifestly fail to promote public safety. Imagine that a government completely forbids self-defense even against culpable aggressors.
If a violent intruder enters my home, I may do nothing to defend
myself, even if I find flight impossible. The most I can do is inform
the intruder that his actions are illegal and subject to punishment by
the government. Such a law, if in fact complied with by the population, would compromise public safety. It is true that it would discourage wrongful or mistaken acts of self-defense-and we would benefit
insofar as we might be the target of such acts. But the cost to our
safety would be great, since we would be uniquely vulnerable to acts of
violence by culpable aggressors. 43 The possibility of punishment after
See JosEPH RAz, THE MoRALITY OF FREEDOM 38-42 (1986).
See, e.g., LocKE, supra note 23, § 19, at 16-17; see also GEORGE BoWYER, CoMMENTARIES ON UNIVERSAL PuBLIC LAw 233 (London, V&R Stevens & G.S. Norton 1854)
40
41

("Every man has a right to defend himself or his property, or even to defend others,
where there is not time or opportunity to call the aid of the civil power.").
42 As we shall later see, individuals' right to self-defense might be justified on
grounds other than public safety. See infra Part I.B.
43 Examples of public safety arguments for self-defense can be found at PAUL H.
RoBINSON, CRIMINAL LAw DEFENSES§ 131 (a) (1984); BoAZ SANGERO, SELF-DEFENCE IN
CRIMINAL LAw § 1.6 (2006); Claire Oakes Finkelstein, On the Obligation of the State to
Extend a Right of Self-Defense to Its Citizens, 147 U. PA. L. REv. 1361, 1397-98 (1999); and
Paul H. Robinson, Competing Theories ofjustification: Deeds v. Reasons, reprinted in HARM
AND CuLPABILITY 45, 46 (A.P. Simester & A.T.H. Smith eds., 1996).
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the fact would not be enough to protect us. Indeed, in many cases
punishment might not occur at all, since the best witness for the prosecution would be dead.
But even if a limitation on governmental authority for manifest
errors could justify a right to self-defense, it is unlikely to justify a right
to bear arms. A law compelling disarmament in the interest of public
safety, even if in fact a mistake, is hardly manifestly a mistake. The
question of whether arms possession makes us safer is one concerning
which there is reasonable disagreement. This suggests that it is precisely the sort of issue that is within the scope of the government's
authority.
As we have seen, the opinion of the court of appeals in Heller
suggested that the District of Columbia's ban on handguns might be a
manifest error, because it "irrationally prevent[s] only law abiding citizens from owning handguns." 44 But the District could plausibly argue
that the reason the ban currently makes citizens of the District less
safe is because of the failure of neighboring states to enact similar bans.
Gun violence, it could argue, must be overcome through collective
action. And collective action will not occur unless some government
takes the first step, even if the first mover will temporarily make its
citizens worse off. It is hard to see how it is beyond a government's
authority to adopt such a strategy.
3.

Are Constitutional Rights That Promote Public Safety Necessary?

But let us assume that the Founders, in addition to thinking that
there were public safety benefits to private arms possession, believed
that these benefits somehow limited the government's authority to disarm the population. It still is unclear why they would have thought
that a constitutional right protecting this limit should be necessary.
Consider, once again, self-defense in cases of imminent violence
at the hands of culpable aggressors. If we have a fundamental interest
in self-defense in such cases, why is there no right to self-defense specified in the U.S. Constitution? 45 The reason, surely, is that constitu44 Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 399 n.17 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
45 To the extent that protection for fundamental interests might be read into the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment, one could argue that
there is such a constitutional right. But the question would still remain why the fundamental interest in self-defense was not explicitly protected the way privacy and dignitary interests were explicitly protected by the Fourth and Eighth Amendments.
Courts have generally refused to read a constitutional right of self-defense into
the Due Process Clause. See Rowe v. DeBruyn, 17 F.3d 1047, 1052 (7th Cir. 1994);
White v. Arn, 788 F.2d 338, 347 (6th Cir. 1986); Fields v. Harris, 675 F.2d 219, 220
(8th Cir. 1982). But see Griffin v. Martin, 785 F.2d 1172, 1177 (4th Cir. 1986), with-
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tional rights are needed to protect only those limits on governmental
authority that might conceivably be violated. The dangers that would
result from prohibiting all acts of self-defense would be so widespread
that a democratic government, being sensitive to the interests of the
majority, would never enact such a law.
In contrast, the fundamental interests protected by other provisions in the Bill of Rights could conceivably be sacrificed by the majority, making constitutional rights protecting these interests advisable.
A common justification for the Eighth Amendment, for example, is
that without it the dignitary interests of those convicted of crimes
would be sacrificed to create punishments with maximum deterrent
effect. 46 Majoritarian processes cannot be counted on to protect
these interests, because the costs of protection are felt by everyone (in
the form of increased crime), while the benefits are felt only by criminal defendants.
A similar story can be told about many other constitutional rights.
The standard theory of the Fourth Amendment47 is that it keeps the
privacy interests of those suspected of crimes from being sacrificed for
the benefits that the majority would receive from more efficient
enforcement of the criminal law. 48 And a common, if not the standard, theory of the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment49 is
that it keeps the autonomy interests that individuals have in speaking

drawn, 795 F.2d 22 (4th Cir. 1986); Isaac v. Engle, 646 F.2d 1129, 1140 (6th Cir. 1980)
(Merritt, J., dissenting) (asserting that the Constitution prohibits a state from eliminating the justification of self-defense). For the argument that a constitutional right
to self-defense exists, see Nicholas]. Johnson, Beyond the Second Amendment: An Individual Right to Arms Viewed Through the Ninth Amendment, 24 RuTGERS LJ. 1, 1-16 (1992)
(arguing that the right to self-defense is incorporated within the Ninth Amendment);
Anders Kaye, Dangerous Places: The Right to Self-Defense in Prison and Prison Conditions
Jurisprudence, 63 U. CHI. L. REv. 693, 704-09 (1996); James E. Robertson, "Fight or
F . .. "and Constitutional Liberty: An Inmate's Right to Self-Defense When Targeted by Aggressors, 29 IND. L. REv. 339, 358-59 (1995).
46 See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560 (2005); Furman v. Georgia, 408
U.S. 238, 269-305 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring).
47 U.S. CaNST. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.").
48 See, e.g., Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767, 772 (1966).
49 U.S. CaNsT. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom
of speech .... ").
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their own minds from being sacrificed to protect the public from the
dangers that such speech might cause. 50
But we have as yet no analogous story of how the majority would
be motivated to sacrifice the fundamental interest in possessing arms
to which the first justification appeals. The benefits of arms possession, like the benefits of self-defense, are apparently widespread. If
private arms possession makes us safer, the majority should be in favor
of it, making constitutional protection unnecessary. 51
Of course, it is not difficult to imagine why a government that is
insensitive to the interests of the majority might be motivated to disarm
the population. Such a tyrannical government might choose disarmament, despite any costs to public safety, because it is worried that an
armed citizenry could rise up against it. But this speaks to the sixth
50 See, e.g., David AJ. Richards, Free Speech and Obscenity Law: Toward a Moral Theory
of the First Amendment, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 45, 90 (1974) [hereinafter Richards, Obscenity
Law]; David AJ. Richards, Toleration and Free Speech, 17 PHIL. & PuB. AFF. 323, 324-25
(1988) [hereinafter Richards, Toleration].
51 It is conceivable that only a minority is made safer by a system of private arms
possession, while the majority benefits from disarmament. Such an idea appears to
stand behind Lester Hunt's and Todd Hughes' defense of the right to bear arms. See
Todd C. Hughes & Lester H. Hunt, The Liberal Basis of the Right to Bear Arms, 14 PuB.
AFF. Q. 1 (2000). Hunt and Hughes argue that even if private arms possession makes
the majority safer, that does not mean that the government may permissibly disarm
individuals:
Let us assume, for the sake of the argument, that the alleged causal relationship between guns and crime really exists. Is this sufficient to justifY a government ban on firearms? In a liberal state, the answer is simple: it is no. In
a consistently liberal system, it is considered highly problematic to dispose of
the rights and liberties of citizens-where these rights and liberties are
believed by their owners to be important-simply and solely because the
community can extract a benefit from doing so.
I d. at 2. The fact that guns as a class are dangerous to the population "is not a legitimate reason for banning guns." Id. at 11. In particular, a policy of disarmament
violates the individual rights of someone who needs arms in self-defense: "To disarm
[such a person], exposing her to mortal danger, because of behavior for which she
apparently bears no causal responsibility at all, is grossly unfair to her." Id. at 12.
Hunt and Hughes do not explain, however, why the benefits the minority
receives from arms possession give it a fundamental interest that can compromise the
safety of the majority. As we have seen, by assuming that the minority is made less safe
by disarmament we do not yet know the aggregate risk of harm to which it is exposed.
It might be receiving the minimal level of security that is its right. If the package of
methods that the government uses to protect citizens from violence is providing it
with an adequate level of protection, how can it object that disarmament is part of
that package? Hunt and Hughes appear to assume, without argument, that disarmament would take the minority below the minimal level of security that the government
must provide.
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justification for the Second Amendment, which I will discuss later. 52
Under this justification, the Second Amendment exists as a protection
against tyranny. Individuals should be given arms for the purpose of a
popular revolution, rather than for private self-defense.
In his opinion, Scalia manages to sidestep the problem of the
Founders' motivation for constitutionally protecting the public safety
benefits of private arms possession. He admits that the enactment of
the Second Amendment was not motivated by a desire to protect the
use of arms in self-defense. The Founders, he argued, were contemplating the justification expressed in the prefatory clause (probably
our sixth). But he insists that even if "self-defense had little to do with
the right's codification; it was the central component of the right
itself." 53 Although the Founders had no motivation to constitutionally
protect the use of arms in self-defense, such protection was a side
effect of the constitutional protection of its use to overthrow or discourage tyranny.
4.

A Puzzle Concerning Scope

Assuming that the Second Amendment protects private arms possession because of its public safety benefits, what consequences does
this have for the Amendment's scope? If the first justification is correct, the Second Amendment constitutionalizes the empirical judgment that private arms possession promotes public safety. As a result,
courts would have to be skeptical about legislatures' judgments concerning the public safety benefits of arms regulation. But we do not
know how far this skepticism is supposed to go. Assume, for example,
that the legislature chooses to ban machine guns because it thinks this
will promote public safety. Most defenders of the Second Amendment believe that this is constitutionally permissible. Don Kates has
argued, for example, that the right to bear arms would not apply to
"weapons such as machine-type guns, flamethrowers, artillery, and
atomic weapons, whose use, even in strict self-defense, would quite
obviously menace one's neighbors." 54
On the one hand, we can criticize Kates' argument on the merits:
if, as he believes, our system of private ownership of handguns makes
us safer, this must be because the system is distributing them to a siza52 See infra Part II.A.
53 District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2801 (2008).
54 Kates, supra note 17, at 146; see also Stephen P. Halbrook, What the Framers
Intended: A Linguistic Analysis of the Right to "Bear Arms, "LAw & CONTEMP. PRoBs., Winter 1986, at 151, 160 ("[H]eavy ordinances are not constitutionally protected. Nor are
other ... unusual weapons ... ." (citations omitted)).

HeinOnline -- 84 Notre Dame L. Rev. 146 2008-2009

2008]

WHY PROTECT PRIVATE ARMS POSSESSION?

ble number of law-abiding citizens who are able to exercise good judgment about when they can be used justifiably. If everyone constantly
used handguns carelessly or mistakenly-if, for example, they often
pointed them in the wrong direction-disarmament would surely be a
better option. But in this respect machine guns look much more like
handguns than nuclear weapons. Although the rapid succession of
machine gun fire to some extent heightens the risk of unjustified
harm to third parties, machine guns are perfectly safe if pointed in
the right direction. If Kates is right that our handguns will generally
be pointed in the right direction, why wouldn't the same thing be true
about our machine guns? The two weapons, it seems, should share
the same constitutional fate.
But the more fundamental problem with Kates' argument is that
he appeals to considerations of public safety to determine the scope of
the Second Amendment. And the Second Amendment is meant to
constitutionally mandate skepticism about public safety arguments. 55
How do we know that Kates' argument is not one of those about
which a court should be skeptical? To be sure, he has offered a plausible argument that prohibition of machine guns would make us
safer. 56 But the Brady Campaign to Prevent Gun Violence can offer
plausible arguments that the prohibition of handguns-or, indeed, all
guns-would make us safer. If a court is not allowed to accept the
Brady Campaign's arguments, how do we know it can accept Kates'?
The first justification makes the Second Amendment look very
different from many other provisions in the Bill of Rights. As we have
seen, rather than having been enacted because of public safety considerations, many provisions in the Bill of Rights exist to keep autonomy
interests from being sacrificed for public safety. To determine the
scope of these constitutional rights, the strength of these autonomy
interests can be our guide. 57 But because under the firstjustification
the Second Amendment protects public safety, nothing like this procedure is possible.
55
56

See supra Part I.A.2-3.
BRADY CENTER TO PREVENT GuN VIOLENCE, WITHOUT A TRAcE: How THE GuN

18 (2006),
http:/ /www.bradycenter.org/xshare/pdf/reports/giw.pdf ("Crime gun tracing studies show that gun laws, by regulating the behavior of gun sellers and buyers in the
legal market, have a profound impact on access to guns by criminals in the illegal
market.").
57 It is common in Fourth Amendment contexts to" 'balanc[e] ... intrusion on
the individual's [privacy] interests against ... promotion of legitimate governmental
interests,'" including governmental interests in public safety. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J
v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652-53 (1995) (quoting Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives'
Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989)).
LoBBY AND THE GoVERNMENT SuPPREss THE TRUTH ABouT GuNs AND CRIME
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It is not surprising, therefore, that Scalia answered the question
of which arms are protected by the Second Amendment in a manner
unrelated to considerations of public safety. Drawing on United States
v. Miller, 5 8 he argued that individuals have a constitutionally protected
interest only in arms "typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for
lawful purposes." 59 This principle excludes "dangerous and unusual
weapons" such as machine guns. 60
The fact that a category of weapon passes the Miller test does not
mean that we would not be safer if it were prohibited. According to
the Miller test, machine guns would be constitutionally protected if
their possession became widespread. And yet they still might undermine public safety. 61 By the same token, the fact that a newly invented
category of weapon fails the Miller test-because, being new, it is not
typically possessed-does not mean that its widespread possession
would not substantially contribute to our safety. 62 The scope of the
Second Amendment becomes unrelated to its underlying justification.
Indeed the Miller test is unrelated not merely to the interests
appealed to in the first justification, but also to those standing behind
the sixth. If the purpose of the Second Amendment is to discourage
governmental tyranny, citizens arguably have an interest in possessing
machine guns, since any tyrannical government would have such
weapons at its disposal. 63
As we have seen, a question of scope not answered in Scalia's
opinion is the standard of review used to assess laws that infringe
upon individuals' Second Amendment interests. An example is a law
that prohibits all convicted felons from owning any firearms. One
might think that if the first justification is correct, strict scrutiny is the
appropriate standard. After all, under the first justification the Second Amendment protects citizens' interests in their self-preservation.
This interest is one of the strongest imaginable. The government, one
might argue, cannot sacrifice this interest unless it has an extremely
compelling reason.
Keep in mind, however, that the first justification gives the Second Amendment a purpose importantly different from other provi58 307 U.S. 174, 179 (1939).
59 District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2816 (2008).
60 /d. at 2817.
61 See id. at 2869 (Breyer,J., dissenting).
62 See id.
63 Scalia recognizes this problem. See Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2817 (majority
opinion).
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sions in the Bill of Rights. The Eighth Amendment64 exists to keep
the majority from sacrificing individuals' dignitary interest for some
other governmental goal, such as deterring crimes. The strength of
the Eighth Amendment, therefore, is tied to the strength of this dignitary interest. But under the first justification the majority is likely to
disarm the population, not because it wants to sacrifice citizens' interest in self-preservation for some other governmental goal, but instead
because it thinks disarmament protects this interest. The strength of
the Second Amendment should be tied, therefore, not to the strength
of individuals' interest in safety, but to the strength of the empirical
conclusion standing behind the Second Amendment that private arms
possession best promotes safety. The question of the standard of
review should depend upon the strength of this empirical conclusion.
The same point would apply to the question of whether Second
Amendment rights are incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment. Second Amendment rights are fundamental and so deserving
of incorporation only to the extent that the empirical conclusion
standing behind the Second Amendment is strong.
There is a final reason to question the first justification. It is a
significant fact that support for the Second Amendment remains even
in the face of evidence that gun ownership makes us less safe. 65 In
affirming the right to bear arms despite this evidence, Second Amendment advocates sound like traditional civil libertarians. The Fourth
Amendment likely makes us less safe, given the frequency with which
its exercise frustrates otherwise legitimate criminal prosecutions. But
this does nothing to undermine its justification. To its defenders, the
same point applies to the Second Amendment. 66 We therefore
should take seriously arguments that the right to bear arms in selfdefense is justified by an autonomy interest unrelated to questions of
public safety. 67
64 U.S. CoNsT. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.").
65 See generally Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, More Statistics, Less Persuasion: A
Cultural Theory of Gun-Risk Perceptions, 151 U. PA. L. REv. 1291, 1293-94 (2003)
("[H]ow an individual feels about gun control will depend a lot on the social meanings that she thinks guns and gun control express, and not just on the consequences
she believes they impose.").
66 See, e.g., Nicholas J. Johnson, Principles and Passions: The Intersection of Abortion
and Gun Rights, 50 RuTGERS L. REv. 97, 129 n.144 (1997) ("The fact that a right is
relatively costly does not justifY giving it a narrow, rather than broad construction.");
Levinson, supra note 4, at 657 (" [W] hy do we not apply such consequentialist criteria
to each and every part of the Bill of Rights?").
67 To be sure, this support for private arms possession in the face of gun violence
could be explained by the idea that it protects against a tyrannical government. Peo-

HeinOnline -- 84 Notre Dame L. Rev. 149 2008-2009

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW

To make the difference between the first and subsequentjustifications clear, I will assume in what follows that a system of private
arms possession makes us more vulnerable to private violence. The
choice to arm oneself presents a prisoner's dilemma. The choice
dominates, in the sense that it makes one safer compared to a fixed
population. But when everyone bears arms, the mutually imposed
risks make us all worse off. The remaining justifications claim that
private arms possession has value meriting constitutional protection
despite this fact.68
B.

Excuse

Let us return to the "natural right of resistance and self-preservation,"69 which Scalia thinks is connected to the right to bear arms. We
have already discussed a public safety argument for a natural right of
self-defense. But there are circumstances where we think individuals
should be allowed to engage in self-defense even when no clear public
safety benefits can be discerned. Consider, for example, the innocent
threat, as described by Robert Nozick:
If someone picks up a third party and throws him at you down at the
bottom of a deep well, the third party is innocent and a threat; had
he chosen to launch himself at you in that trajectory he would be an
aggressor. Even though the falling person would survive his fall
onto you, may you use your ray gun to disintegrate the falling body
before it crushes and kills you? 70

Although the legal status of self-defense against innocent threats
is unclear,7 1 many people believe that self-defense in such cases
should be permitted. 72 We cannot justifY this right of self-defense on
public safety grounds, for allowing self-defense against innocent
pie might be willing to accept gun violence in order to receive security against
tyranny.
68 Of course, it is not essential to these later justifications that private arms possession undermines public safety. These justifications simply claim that its value is unrelated to considerations of public safety. But this is best highlighted by assuming
scenarios where its contribution to public safety is negative.
69 District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2838 (2008) (quoting 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 8, at *139)_
70 RoBERT NozJCK, ANARCI-N, STATE, AND UTOPIA 34 (1974); see also Judith Jarvis
Thomson, Self-Defense, 20 PHIL. & PuB. AFF. 283, 287 (1991) (presenting another
example of the innocent threat and concluding that there is no moral difference in
the use of self-defense when the aggressor is innocent or villainous).
71 See Sanford H. Kadish, Respect for Life and Regard for Rights in the Criminal Law,
64 CAL. L. REv. 871, 875-76 (1976).
72 See Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Self-Defense and the State, 5 OHIO ST.j. CruM. L. 449,
468-69 (2008) ("[A]t the very least, a liberal state should excuse the killing of an
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threats does not increase the likelihood that innocent life will be
saved.
Why do we think self-defense in such cases is justified? One possibility is that it is not justified at all, but simply excused. 73 Defending
oneself against an innocent threat should not be punished, because
we would never be able to abide by a law prohibiting self-defense
when the time came. The desire for self-protection would simply be
too great. We would always defend ourselves and take the chance of
punishment for violating the law. Given that we cannot abide by a law
prohibiting self-defense in such circumstances, it is beyond the government's authority to enact such a law.
Excuse is arguably the reason that Hobbes thought that "the right
of resisting them that assault him by force" cannot be alienated, even
to the sovereign. 74 A number of Second Amendment advocates have
appealed to such passages in Hobbes as support for an inalienable
right to bear arms. This suggests that they think the right to bear
arms, like the right to self-defense, is based on excuse.7 5 Scalia too
might be referring to excuse when he speaks of the right to bear arms
as grounded in a "natural right of resistance and self-preservation." 76
But excuse is insufficient to justify a right to bear arms. Selfdefense is excused because we could not possibly abide by a law
prohibiting self-defense. We would always defend ourselves even if
innocent aggressor because the defender in such a case has lived up to all we can
reasonably expect of him ." ) ; Kadish, supra note 71, at 875-76.
73 Both Kadish and Ferzan themselves suggest that self-defense against an innocent is justified rather than excused. See Ferzan, supra note 72, at 452; Kadish, supra
note 71, at 881-82. I shall not discuss this issue here.
74 See THOMAS HoBBES, LEVIATHAN 82 (Edwin Curley ed., Hackett Publ'g Co.
1994) (1651). It is not clear, however, that Hobbes is arguing for an excuse in the
normal sense of the word at all. He might be arguing for something like a
Hohfeldian privilege to engage in self-defense. See WESLEY NEWCOMB HoHFELD, FuNDAMENTAL LEGAL CoNCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN juDICIAL REAsoNING 35-50 (photo.
reprint 2000) (Walter Wheeler Cook ed., 1919) . One will not be violating any duties
to the sovereign by resisting, but the sovereign will not be violating any duties by
punishing one's resistance. See Finkelstein, supra note 43, at 1388-90; Jeremy Waldron, Self-Defense: Agent-Neutral and Agent-Relative Accounts, 88 CAL. L. REv. 711, 732
(2000) . For a fuller discussion of Hobbes's argument, see Claire Finkelstein, A Puzzle
About Hobbes on Self-Defense, 82 PAc. PHIL. Q. 332 (2001). For an excuse theory of selfdefense, see Larry Alexander, A Unified Excuse of Preemptive Self-Pmtection, 74 NoTRE
DAME L. REv. 1475 (1999).
75 See Barnett & Kates, supra note 17, at 1177-78 n.l84; Nelson Lund, The Second
Amendment, Political Liberty, and the Right to Self-Preservation, 39 ALA. L. REv. 103, 119
(1987).
76 District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2838 (2008) (quoting I BLACKSTONE, supra note 8, at *139) .
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self-defense were subject to very serious penalties. It is simply false,
however, that people could not possibly abide by a law prohibiting
private arms possession. If that were true, it would be impossible for
the government to disarm us. We would always choose to remain
armed, and take the punishment for violating the law. But there simply is no overwhelming desire to possess arms that is analogous to our
instinct to defend ourselves in response to an immediate threat. For
this reason, the government has no grounds for excusing arms
possession.
It is true that someone faced with imminent violence will have an
overwhelming desire for a gun-a desire so strong that he would be
willing to arm himself at that time whatever the law says about the matter. This could excuse someone, like MacGyver, who fashions arms on
the spot to deal with the threat. 77 It would also excuse anyone who
grabs arms that happen to be at hand to protect himself. But the fact
that the government cannot prohibit a citizen from using arms that
are in fact present does not mean that it cannot prohibit that citizen
from having them present in the first place.
This is not to say that many people do not experience a strong
desire to arm themselves, even when they are not currently facing an
attacker. But rather than being the sort of irresistible impulse that
could be the basis of an excuse, this desire can be explained by the
fact that arming oneself is the dominant strategy in a prisoner's
dilemma. One will always be safer compared to a fixed population if
one is armed. But even if arms possession is attractive for this reason,
it still might be the case that when we all choose to arm ourselves, the
mutually imposed risks of harm make us collectively worse off. Since a
primary purpose of a government's authority is overcoming prisoner's
dilemmas, the fact that we desire arms is no reason to think that disarmament is beyond the government's authority.
C.

Equality

Another common argument for private arms possession appeals
to the leveling character of arms. They reduce disparities in physical
strength:
The capacity of firearms to be a tool for self-defense promotes
equality in general, and not merely between battered women and
their male batterers . . . . The force of non-gun weapons such as
knives and clubs is, like the force of bare hands, strongly contingent
on the size, strength, and skill of their users: the weaker of two people equally armed with a non-gun weapon is still at a potentially fatal
77

MacGyver (ABC television broadcast 1985-1992).

HeinOnline -- 84 Notre Dame L. Rev. 152 2008-2009

2008]

WHY PROTECT PRIVATE ARMS POSSESSION?

1 53

disadvantage. In typical self-defense situations, however, firearms
are equally harmful in anyone's hands, provided the individuals
handling them have the capacity to fire them and reasonably good
aim at close range. Two people equally armed with guns, then, are
very likely to have equal harming and coercive power, regardless of
their physical disparities. Firearms actually equalize the balance of
power between persons who are naturally unequal. 78

Of course, we can question whether arms really have an equalizing
effect. For example, if men, in addition to being generally larger and
stronger, are naturally more aggressive and so more likely to acquire
arms, allowing private arms possession may exacerbate the inequality
between the sexes. But let us assume that the equalizing effect is real.
Another problem with this justification is that if the value of arms
lies in their equalizing effect, it would appear to justify arms possession only for those at a physical disadvantage. Giving arms to the
physically dominant frustrates the goal of equalization. So we would
not have an argument that all citizens have a fundamental interest in
arms possession.
But, more significantly, it is hard to see how a compelling argument for the Second Amendment can be derived simply from the
equalizing effect of arms. We need to keep in mind that we are trying
to figure out why individuals have a fundamental interest in private
arms possession even if arms reduce public safety-that is, even if people are made more vulnerable to armed criminal assaults. I doubt
that equality of physical strength is such an important value that we
would be willing to limit a democratic government's ability to make
the public safer to protect it.
In fact, the third justification is probably a version of the first.
Those offering such an argument are probably envisioning the equalizing effect of innocent women using arms in justified self-defense
against culpable men. They are not thinking of the equalizing effect
of culpable women using arms to engage in violent criminal assaults
against innocent men. Nor are they considering how, independent of
the equalizing effect, arms might be used in violent criminal assaults
by women against women and by men against men. By concentrating
only on justified uses of arms they appear to assume that such uses
predominate and thus that private arms possession makes us safer.
They simply add to the first justification the observation that private
arms possession brings a secondary beneficial effect-namely a reduction of the disadvantages felt by women, the small, and the weak.
78 Hughes & Hunt, supra note 51 , at 16.
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D.

Lockean Autonomy

The fourth justification is the most elusive, but in the end might
be the most promising. It claims that individuals have a fundamental
interest in possessing arms for self-defense, as an expression of Lockean values of autonomy and individualism. But to show why arms possession might be valuable for this reason, I need to say a bit more
about Locke's political theory and why, according to Lockean principles, there is a right to bear arms in the state of nature.
1.

Locke on the Origin and Limits of Governmental Authority

For Locke, the government's authority has its source in the consent of the governed. People are free to live independently of any
political obligation, in what he called the "state of nature," if they
choose to do so. They have no duty to submit to the state. But Locke
thought that individuals would in fact give up many of the rights they
enjoy in the state of nature to the maJority (or the government to
which the majority entrusts its power). 79 Most significantly, they
would give up their natural "executive" right to private enforcement
of natural rights. Mter entering into the social contract, only the
majority (or its government) possesses the power to adjudicate and
punish violations of rights. 80 Individuals are bound by its decision,
even if they believe it is wrong.
Individuals are motivated to enter into the social contract
because of the "inconveniences" of the state of nature. 81 These inconveniences do not result from the fact that we may do whatever we
want. Within the state of nature we have duties not "to harm another
in his life, health, liberty or possessions." 82 The problem is instead
that we are fallible judges about whether natural rights have been violated. Although we have the power through reason to recognize the
general principles of naturallaw, 83 we can make mistakes, particularly
in our application of the principles of natural law to the facts. 84 This
79 See LocKE, supra note 23, §§ 94-99, at 54-55.
80 !d.§§ 95, 99, at 55-56; D.A. LLOYD THoMAS, LocKE ON GoVERNMENT 27 (1995).
81 LocKE, supra note 23, §§ 124-27, at 70-71.
82 !d. § 6, at 9.
83 !d. § 6, at 9, § 12, at 13, § 124, at 70.
84 !d. § 124, at 70 ("[T]hough the law of Nature be plain and intelligible to all
rational creatures, yet men, being biased by their interest, as well as ignorant for want
of study of it, are not apt to allow of it as a law binding to them in the application of it
to their particular cases."); see also id. § 136, at 76-77 (discussing the need for standing laws to reduce human mistakes in adjudication).
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is because we tend to interpret our own rights and the rights of our
kin too broadly.s5
As a result, the state of nature can devolve into a state of war.
Someone who perceives his rights to have been violated will seek to
exercise what he believes is his right to punish, creating what the punished party perceives to be a rights violation that in turn allows her to
punish. Because of these mutually imposed risks of mistaken judgments about rights violations, private enforcement puts everyone in a
worse position than they would be if they were subject to a single arbitrator, even though the arbiter can itself make mistakes.
But Locke did not think that individuals would alienate all their
rights. Some they would reserve against the majority and its government. Indeed, some rights, being inalienable, would remain reserved
even if individuals tried to give them up. 8 6 If these reserved rights are
violated, one is released from the government's authority and so may
justifiably resist. A Lockean justification for the Second Amendment,
therefore, would argue that individuals have a right to bear arms in
the state of nature and that they reserved this right when entering into
the social contract. Notice that it is not sufficient to argue, as Scalia
does, that there is a natural right to bear arms, in the sense that one
possesses that right in the state of nature. One must show that the
natural right was reserved upon entering into the social contract.
2.

The Natural Right to Bear Arms

Our first question is whether one has a right to bear arms in the
state of nature. There is a simple argument that such a natural right
exists. For Locke, the only rights possessed by a government are those
alienated to it by individuals. Therefore, if individuals had no natural
right to bear arms, nations would have no right to arm themselves.
Although disarmament by nations is commonly thought to be advisable, few people would say that a nation is acting beyond its authority
by having an army.
But a more detailed Lockean argument for a natural right to bear
arms can also be provided. The right, one can argue, is derivable
from the natural executive right-that is, one's right in the state of
85 /d. § 13, at 13, § 125, at 70.
86 To say a right is inalienable is not to make a claim about the strength of the
right. It does not mean, for example, that the right cannot be overridden by other
moral considerations. Furthermore, to say that inalienable rights cannot be voluntarily relinquished does not mean that they cannot be forfeited, for example, through
wrongdoing. On Locke's understanding of inalienable rights, see Simmons, supra
note 38.
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nature "to judge of his right [and], according to the best of his power
to maintain it."8 7 Furthermore, this derivation makes it clear that the
right to bear arms exists independently of any tendency of private
arms possession to make us safer.
It is worth emphasizing that the executive right itself cannot be
understood as existing because it contributes to public safety or, more
generally, because it ensures that our other natural rights will be
respected. 88 We enter into the social contract because our natural
rights are less secure when we possess the executive right. With a
right to private enforcement of natural rights, we overreach-and this
overreaching results in violations of natural rights. If our only concern were ensuring that our other natural rights were not violated, we
would have no executive right at all. Instead, we would be morally
required to give up our power to punish to the state.s9 And it is a
defining characteristic of Locke's political theory, and consent theories of the state generally, that there is no duty, independent of that
created by consent, to submit to governmental authority.
We must assume, therefore, that Locke assigned a value to the
executive right that is independent of its tendency to protect our
other natural rights. He understood it to be valuable on its own, in a
manner tied to fundamental principles of autonomy and individualism. Each of us has the right to private enforcement of natural rights
even though the combined effect of the exercise of this right is the
increase in rights violations.
Precisely because it increases the violation of our other natural
rights, our executive right exists in uneasy tension with those other
rights. It is tempting to resolve this tension by accommodating our
other natural rights to our executive right. For example, one might
argue that in the state of nature each of us has a Hohfeldian privilege
to act as he sees morally fit. If I punish what I take to be a rights
violation, I have not violated the punished person's natural rights.
Conversely, if the punished person takes the punishment to be a
rights violation, he will not violate my natural rights if he retaliates. 90
The inconveniences of the state of nature would result from the collective exercise of these privileges.
87 LocKE, supra note 23, § 91, at 51.
88 Locke himself sometimes suggests this, for he argues that "every one has a right
to punish the transgressors of that law to such a degree as may hinder its violation ."
/d. § 7, at 10.
89 Cf DAVID S CHMIDTZ, THE LIMITS OF GoVERNMENT 38-39 (1991) (suggesting
that if one has a right to punish only by the least risky acceptable method, even those
remaining in the state of nature have to let the state punish for them).
90 See HoHFELD, supra note 74, at 35-50.
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But this cannot make sense of Locke's frequent claims that natural rights are still the "measure God has set to the actions of men." 91
Those acting according to their moral lights in the state of nature
remain responsible if they get things wrong. "[I]f he that judges,
judges amiss in his own, or any other case, he is answerable for it to
the rest of mankind." 92 One must conclude, therefore, that Locke
thought that the executive right exists despite its conflict with our
other natural rights. What is good about our executive right is not
that it will increase the chance that natural rights are respected, but
rather that it allows us to use our own moral judgment to take a
chance-even a bad chance-at vindicating natural rights.
A natural right to bear arms appears to follow from this executive
right. We may bear arms in the state of nature because it allows us to
more effectively enforce our own vision of natural rights. Arms are
not good because they make us safer. Indeed, because they allow us
to more effectively exercise our executive right, arms exacerbate the
inconveniences of the state of nature. Feuding and mistaken acts of
self-defense become more deadly when people are armed. But, once
again, if these inconveniences were sufficient to justify disarmament,
they would also justify a duty to submit to the state.
This natural right to bear arms is not simply an agent-relative
right that I assert for myself, as a means of vindicating my vision of
natural rights.9 3 It is not as if, from my perspective, I can arm myself
and disarm you and, from your perspective, you can arm yourself and
disarm me. Rather, the right is one that each must extend to everyone else in the state of nature. I may not disarm you simply because
of the chance that you may make a mistake concerning natural rights.
You too have the right to take a chance and vindicate natural rights as
you see fit. But you remain answerable for the consequences. If I find
that you have misused your guns, I may retaliate.
It is a delicate matter, however, determining the strength and
scope of the natural right to bear arms. Although it gives each of us
the freedom to expose one another to a heightened risk of rights violations, there is surely some point at which the risk becomes so great
that the person exposed may take preventative action. Locke is clear
that in the state of nature I may permissibly thwart attempts to violate
91 LocKE, supra note 23, § 8, at 10-11; see also id. § 241, at 131 (declaring that
God is "judge of the right").
92 /d.§ 13, at 14; see also id. § 4, at 8, § 17, at 15-16, §59, at 34-35, § 128, at 71,
§§ 241-42, at 131 (acknowledging that in the state of nature, men are subject and
bound by the law of nature). We are answerable for the consequences even if our
decision was reasonable when made. See SIMMONS, supra note 36, at 145.
93 I thank Stephen Perry for motivating me to clarify this point.
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my natural rights. My respect for another's executive right does not
require me to wait until my rights have actually been violated to
respond. 94 In the course of thwarting such attempts, I surely may disarm my attacker.
But I may not disarm someone who merely possesses a firearm. It
is true that people tend to make mistakes about the proper scope of
natural rights and so misuse of the firearm might occur. Indeed, it is
possible that we would all be safer if we were forcibly disarmed. But,
again, if the inconveniences of the state of nature could justify disarmament, they could also justify forcible induction into the state.
And that is contrary to core Lockean principles. In the state of
nature, therefore, individuals possess a right to bear arms, including
dangerous arms like machine guns.
Many arguments that the right to bear arms is tied to a natural
right of self-defense can be interpreted as referring to our natural
executive right. Such arguments often wrongly emphasize little old
ladies using guns to protect themselves against violent assailants. 95
This suggests that the acts covered by the natural right of self-defense
include only justified self-defense and that arms are valuable for the
reasons claimed by the first justification. Because the use of arms in
justified self-defense will outweigh their unjustified use, a system of
private arms possession makes us safer from unjustified harm. But
also present in such arguments is the idea that the use of arms even in
unjustified self-defense has value. Arms are valuable not merely when
a little old lady justifiably kills a violent assailant, but also when she
kills a postman, mistaking him for a violent assailant. For in the latter
case as well, she was able to vindicate what she took to be her rightsand face the consequences. It is because Second Amendment advocates see arms as tied to one's natural executive right-and more
broadly to Lockean values of autonomy and individualism-that they
so often claim that gun ownership fosters "vigorous virtues of independence, self-reliance, and vigilance." 96
See LocKE, supra note 23, § 16, at 15.
See, e.g., RoBERT A. WATERS, THE BEST DEFENSE (1998); RoBERT A. WATERS,
GuNs SAVE LIVEs (2002); Robert L. Barrow, Women with Attitude: Self Protection, Policy,
and the Law, 21 T.jEFFERSON L. REv. 59,59-60 (1999).
96 David Harmer, Securing a Free State: Why the Second Amendment Matters, 1998 BYU
L. REv. 55, 100; see also Kahan & Braman, supra note 65, at 1300-01 (referencing
works that have identified guns as symbols of honor, courage, chivalry, and individual
self-sufficiency); Bruce Mills, Editorial, Gun Ownership Is a Net Benefit to Society, HAMILTON SPEGfATOR (Can.), Oct. 19, 2006, at A14 ("The gun culture ... fosters independence, self-reliance, self-esteem and confidence in the individual."); Glenn Reynolds,
Editorial, A Rifle in Every Pot, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2007, at A21 (describing a town's

94
95
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Wasn't the Natural Right to Bear Arms Alienated Upon
Entering the Social Contract?

But to say that there is a natural right to bear arms does not mean
that individuals have a fundamental interest in arms possession that
limits the authority of the government-for the natural right might
have been alienated upon entering the social contract.
Many Second Amendment advocates argue that the right is inalienable. As Charlton Heston, then President of the National Rifle
Association, put it:
What civil right could possibly be more fundamental than the
right to protect your life, your family and your freedom from whoever would take it away?
The right to keep and bear arms may be our Second Amendment as Americans, but you can bet on this: It's our first freedom as
humans.
"All men were created equal" may have been our message in
1963.

Today, let our message be just as simple and just as strong: "All
people have an unalienable right to defend their lives and their liberty from whomever [sic] would harm them, and with whatever
means necessary." 97
Once again, this might be understood as the first justification.
Heston might be claiming that a system of private arms possession so
contributes to our safety that we have a fundamental interest in owning arms, an interest that we cannot relinquish. But Heston's claim
that the right allows one to use any means necessary, apparently without regard for the mutually imposed risks that might result, suggests
that he believes this right exists even if we are made less safe as a
result. He appears to be pointing to a right to bear arms that is
derived from our natural executive right.
But, so understood, Heston is clearly wrong that the right is inalienable. There is no reason to think that we could not, in the interest
of collective security, give up our natural right to bear arms. In fact,
we have done so to some extent, insofar as we think is within the government's authority to prohibit very dangerous firearms such as
machine guns, which we would be able to possess in the state of
nature.
mandatory gun ownership law as "a statement about preparedness in the event of an
emergency, and an effort to promote a culture of self-reliance").
97 Charlton Heston, Address to the Congress of Racial Equality at Its Annual Banquet in Honor of Dr. Martin Luther King,J r. (Jan. 15, 2001), available at http://www.
newsmax.com/ archives/ articles/ 2001 / 3/19/21 0522.shtml.
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Indeed, the idea that any part of the natural right to bear arms
might have been reserved appears problematic. To be sure, we might
reserve certain natural rights, like privacy, upon entering the social
contract, even though these rights are alienable. 98 But privacy has a
value that continues to make sense when one is subject to the authority of the state. The same, one might argue, is not true about arms.
One enters into the social contract because of the inconveniences of
the state of nature. Why reserve a right to something-like the possession of handguns-that brings about the very inconveniences that one
is seeking to avoid?
This resistance to the idea that any part of the natural right to
bear arms would be reserved is undoubtedly tied to the idea that alienation of the executive right-unlike the alienation of a right to privacy-is essential to the social contract. As Locke put it, when leaving
the state of nature one must give up the liberty "to do whatsoever he
thinks fit for the preservation of himself' and "the power to punish
the crimes committed against [natural] law." 99 One no longer possesses the right to act upon one's own judgment concerning the
proper scope of self-defense and punishment. One is bound by the
judgment of the majority even when one believes that its decision is
mistaken. 100 Since our executive right must be alienated, it appears
that the right to bear arms-which is tied to the executive right-must
also be. 101
It is for this reason that many see Second Amendment advocates
as "anarchistic" 102 and opposed to "communal strateg[ies] for collective security." 103 They seem to reject the very reason we have governments in the first place. As Gary Wills has put it: "Every civilized
society must disarm its citizens against each other. . . . Every handgun
owned in America is an implicit declaration of war on one's neighbor.
98 It seems permissible for individuals who are very worried about crime to give to
the government greater investigative powers than the Fourth Amendment currently
allows. If a Lockean understands the Fourth Amendment as enforcing a preexisting
limitation on the authority of the government, therefore, he must understand the
reserved right of privacy that the Amendment protects as alienable, but not in fact
alienated.
99 LocKE, supra note 23, § 128, at 71.
100 See id. § 87, at 49.
101 See Steven]. Heyman, Natural Rights and the Second Amendment, 76 CHI.-KENT L.
REv. 237, 243-44 (2000).
102 Carl T. Bogus, The Hidden Histary of the Second Amendment, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REv.
309, 320 (1998).
103 Michael A. Bellesiles, Suicide Pact: New Readings of the Second Amendment, 16
CoNST. CoMMENT. 247, 259 (1999).
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When the chips are down, its owner says, he will not trust any other
arbiter but force personally wielded." 104
It is undoubtedly true that any argument that the natural executive right limits the authority of the government faces an uphill battle.
But simply because the executive right creates the inconveniences of
the state of nature, it does not follow that upon submitting to governmental authority its value evaporates. It remains something that we
can appreciate. Indeed its value is constantly affirmed in popular culture, when a Charles Bronson figure takes the enforcement of rights
into his own hands. 105 And because it has enduring attraction despite
its costs, a Lockean might argue that someone entering the social contract could, as a discretionary matter, choose to reserve it to some
extent, while delineating the scope of the reserved right sufficiently to
ensure that the most serious inconveniences of the state of nature are
avoided.
For example, individuals might reserve a right to duel-provided
that its exercise would not devolve into a state ofwar. 106 This does not
mean dueling is an inalienable right. It clearly is not. Nor do those
reserving a right to duel have to believe that dueling is valuable
because it tends to protect their other rights. They may recognize that
people interpret the scope of their rights in their favor, making dueling an inefficient method of rights enforcement. But they might nevertheless reserve the right to duel out of respect for Lockean values of
autonomy and individualism.
A similar story might be told about the Second Amendment. Citizens might have retained some of the natural right to bear arms, provided that it was carefully circumscribed to avoid too many of the
inconveniences of the state of nature. Once again, this right would be
reserved, even though it would increase the level of violence between
private citizens, out of respect for Lockean values of autonomy and
individualism. Such a justification captures the commonly held view
that arms are "ideal symbols of freedom and sovereignty" 107 and that
104 Don B. Kates, Jr., Public opinion: The Effects of .Cxtremist Discourse on the Gun
Debate, in THE GREAT AMERICAN GuN DEBATE 93, 109 (Don B. Kates, Jr. & Gary Kleck
eds., 1997) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
105 See DEATH WrsH (Dino DeLaurentis Company 1974) (depicting the story of
Paul Kersey, a mild-mannered New York businessman turned vigilante after the murder of his wife and rape of his daughter).
106 One limitation that keeps dueling from descending into the state of war is that
both parties to the duel consent to the harms that occur in the context of the duel.
The fact that someone is killed in a duel may not itself be pointed to by the decedent's kin as a wrong that justifies another duel.
107 David Neilson, The Biggest Con (May 3, 2000), http:/ /www.keepandbeararms.
com/information/XciBViewI tern .asp?ID=619.

HeinOnline -- 84 Notre Dame L. Rev. 161 2008-2009

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW

compelled disarmament by the government is a "humiliating and
debasing degradation." 10B
But what about those who reject consent theories of the state?
Mter all, Lockean theories of governmental authority are no longer in
favor among political philosophers. John Rawls, for example, considered individuals to have a duty to support and obey the law of largely
just states whether or not they have consented to the state's authority.109 The duty exists simply by virtue of being human. 110 Ronald
Dworkin is another example of someone who does not take governmental authority to rest upon consent. 111
To be sure, even those who reject consent theories of political
obligation see the authority of democratic governments as limited by
certain fundamental interests of individuals. 112 For these philosophers, therefore, a justification for the Second Amendment might still
be available, if it was shown that individuals have a fundamental interest in private arms possession that limits the authority of all governments. But a belief in a duty to submit to governmental authority
makes it particularly difficult to see arms possession as a fundamental
interest. A Lockean might admire Charles Bronson. But those who
reject consent theories of political obligation, one might argue, would
see no value in Bronson's exploits. They think that we have a duty to
submit to governmental authority because of the risks created by private enforcement-a duty, in short, not to be Charles Bronson. Since
we have such a duty, how can they think we have a fundamental interest in arms possession?
108 James Biser Whisker, The Citizen-Soldier Under Federal and State Law, 94 W. VA. L.
REv. 947, 963 n.52 (1992) (quoting 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CoNVENTIONS ON THE ADoPTION OF THE FEDERAL CoNSTITUTION 168 Oonathan Elliot ed.,
1836) (statement of Patrick Henry)); see also Justin Darr, Why Liberals Love Gun Control Uan. 10, 2005), http:/ /www.renewamerica.us/columns/darr/050110 ("[G]un
control laws ... will erode the sense of independence and self reliance of regular
people until they feel that they can do nothing that does not meet government
approval.") .
109 See joHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JusTICE 115, 333-42 (1971).
110 See id.
Ill See RONALD DwoRKIN, LAw's EMPIRE 195-202 (1986).
112 See RoNALD DwoRKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 105 (1985); RoNALD DwoRKIN,
TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 147 (1977); joHN RAWLS, PoLITICAL LIBERALISM, xvi-xviii
(1993); RAWLS, supra note 109, at 363-65. For Rawls, these principles of justice limiting the authority of the state are those that would have been consented to by rational
actors in ignorance of many particular facts about themselves. But this is not a consent theory of the Lockean form . The consent is hypothetical, not actual , and is not
used to demonstrate that the individual in fact has a duty of obedience. It is instead a
method of arriving at our considered intuitions about justice.
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The best argument available is to point to other interests commonly thought of as fundamental that themselves appear tied to the
executive right. Consider the right of a civil plaintiff to bring a lawsuit. This right is often described as protecting certain participatory
interests, interests that are independent of the truth-seeking function
of the trial. 113 But by respecting these interests, we have recreated
some of the inconveniences of the state of nature. By bringing a lawsuit and compelling the defendant to bear the burdens of a response,
the plaintiff is allowed to exact a penalty upon someone she believes
has violated her rights, despite the fact that she will tend to interpret
the scope of her rights in her favor. Indeed, the result can be feuding:
A, perceiving her rights to have been violated, will sue B, an act which
B will perceive as a violation of his rights, motivating him to retaliate
by counterclaiming against A. 114
To be sure, these participatory rights are reined in, most notably
by limits-largely weak and underenforced-on frivolous litigation.1I 5
But why do they exist at all? Can't one argue that they are contrary to
the very purpose of governmental authority? Mter all, one has a duty
to submit to such authority because of the conflict that results when
people engage in private enforcement. Why would one have a fundamental interest in engaging in the very activity that the government is
meant to end? Why shouldn't the government have the authority to
fully control rights enforcement? Why do civil lawsuits exist? An
answer is that individuals have a fundamental interest in the protection, to some extent, of Lockean values of autonomy and individualism. This is something that even those who reject consent theories of
political obligation can accept.
The same point can be made concerning the participatory rights
of criminal defendants. Consider the argument that the privilege
against self-incrimination "rebukes government when, by omission or
113 See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural]ustice, 78 S. CAL. L. REv. 181, 273-305
(2004).
114 Benjamin Zipursky has recently offered an account of private law as involving a
partial alienation to the state of the rights that one possesses in the state of nature.
See Benjamin C. Zipursky, Philosophy of Private Law, in THE OxFoRD HANDBOOK OF
juRISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAw 631-32 Uules Colemen & Scott Shapiro eds.,
2002). One's alienation is partial insofar as one retains a right of action, which one
can exercise, at one's discretion, through the court system. One's natural right to
redress is channeled through the state. /d. at 632-36; see also john C.P. Goldberg, The
Constitutional Status of Tort Law: Due Process and the Right to a Law for the Redress of
Wrongs, 115 YALE LJ. 524, 541-44 (2005) ("In sum, Locke's social contract theory
claims that victims of wrongs possess a natural right to reparations from wrongdoers
and that government ... owes it to them to provide a law of reparations.").
115 See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 11.
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commission, it inhibits, stultifies, or interrupts the process by which
the accused decides what to do about whatever criminal responsibility
rests at his doorstep." 116 This popular argument for the privilege
seems in conflict with the very idea of governmental authority. The
whole point of the state is to keep the individual from relying on his
own judgment about his wrongdoing. To the extent that he relies on
his own judgment, he will read the scope of rights and duties in his
favor. Allowing a criminal defendant to frustrate the government's
investigation, simply on the ground that he believes he has done nothing wrong, sounds anarchistic.ll 7 It recreates the very conflict that
government was meant to end. The existence of governmental obligation should, it seems, carry with it an obligation to participate in its
investigation into one's own wrongdoing. Why then is the privilege
thought to go "to the nature of a free man and to his relationship to
the state"? 118 The answer, once again, is that it is a limited protection
of Lockean values of autonomy and individualism.
The same argument can be used to justify an individual right to
bear arms. Granted, private arms possession tends to increase the
costs of mistaken judgments about the scope of one's rights. But the
right to initiate civil lawsuits and the privilege against self-incrimination have similar costs. In each case, we preserve some of the entitlement that we possessed in the state of nature, out of respect for
individual autonomy.
4.

A Thought Experiment

Admittedly, not everyone sees firearm possession as having the
symbolic significance of participatory rights at trial. But I believe that
most of us are committed to the idea that we have a fundamental
interest in some sort of capacity to engage in violent defense of what
we perceive to be our rights-an interest that is in tension with the
very idea of the authority of the state. There is a point at which governmental interference in this capacity will seem impermissible.
That most of us have such intuitions can be revealed by the following thought experiment: Imagine that people have the capacity to
116 Thomas S. Schrock et al., Interrogational Rights: Reflections on Miranda v. Arizona, 52 S. CAL. L. REv. 1, 49 (1978).
117 See Michael Steven Green, The Paradox of Auxiliary Rights: The P1ivilege Against
Self-Incrimination and the Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 52 DuKE LJ. 113, 133-56 (2002)
[hereinafter Green, Paradox]; Michael S. Green, The Privilege's Last Stand: The Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination and the Right to Rebel Against the State, 65 BROOK. L. REv. 627
( 1999) [hereinafter Green, Last Stand].
ll8 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 261 (1967) (Fortas,J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
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throw a punch or engage in similar violent acts-whether in aggression or self-defense-only because of the presence of a naturally
occurring substance in drinking water. (The substance does not generate the intention to act violently, but simply allows one to carry out
the intention physically.) This substance has always been present,
which is why we always assumed we were biologically capable of violence. But it can easily be removed. Is it within the government's
authority to do so?
I believe that most of us would say no. The reason is not that the
government would be interfering with our right against bodily interference. The government would not be introducing a substance into
our bodies that makes us passive. It would merely keep a substance
from entering our bodies that allows us to act violently. Nor can the
reason be that the ability to punch makes us safer. It is entirely possible that we would be safer-and our rights more secure-if we lacked
this ability. The reason, it seems, is that losing this ability means losing some of our autonomy, because it would limit our capacity to protect and vindicate our rights as we see fit. We would experience it as a
humiliating subordination to the state, even though we know that the
authority of the state exists precisely to limit our capacity to vindicate
rights as we see fit. In short, we would describe it exactly the way Second Amendment advocates describe disarmament.
The difference between Second Amendment advocates and their
opponents, it seems, is that the former have the attitude toward guns
that the latter have toward their fists. Both attitudes are in tension
with the very idea of governmental authority. It should not be inconceivable, therefore, even to those who fail to see the powerful symbolic value of guns, that an individual right to bear arms might have
been enshrined in the United States Constitution.
Notice that this justification is able to identify the special value of
guns that makes them worthy of protection. The problem with disarmament is not that it restricts our liberty to do what we want. Any
law does that. Guns are special because they allow us to defend our
vision of our rights. Because they are connected to our status as moral
agents, our autonomy is more profoundly violated by disarmament
than by misappropriation of our other property.
5.

Problems of Scope

Although the fourth justification captures common intuitions in
favor of the Second Amendment, it makes determining the scope of
the Amendment very difficult. The scope of provisions in the Bill of
Rights is commonly determined by reference to the autonomy interest
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that is protected. I I 9 And the nature and strength of this interest is a
matter about which courts usually have robust intuitions.
Things are more difficult with the Second Amendment. A court
might have a fairly clear view about the scope of the natural right to
bear arms. But the Second Amendment cannot conceivably protect
the entire natural right. The problem is not merely that we would be
allowed to own machine guns. The natural right to bear arms is tied
to our natural executive right. If the entire right were protected, we
would have the right to be Charles Bronson: we would be allowed to
bypass the criminal justice system and use our guns to hunt down and
kill someone we suspected to have murdered a family member. We
could not be punished for our actions, as long as we were in the end
right about who the murderer was.
The Second Amendment must protect something significantly
less than the natural right, just as the right to duel protects something
less than the natural executive right. And, like the right to duel, the
scope of the right to bear arms will largely be determined by symbolic
considerations. 120 Only arms that are the symbolic embodiments of
Lockean autonomy and individualism would be protected.
Curiously, the fourth justification could give some support to the
Miller test advocated by Scalia in Heller. 121 A type of arms is unlikely to
play a symbolic role if it is not typically owned by the population.
Likewise, the protected use of arms might be limited to typical usemost notably legally permissible self-defense. It would not extend to
the vigilantism that is allowed in the state of nature.

E.

Anarchism

The next justification (our fifth) does not claim that the use of
arms in private self-defense is a fundamental interest that limits the
authority of the state. It is not a condition for governmental authority
that citizens are allowed to possess arms-the way it is a condition that
they are allowed to engage in free speech or that cruel and unusual
punishments are not imposed. Instead, the fifth justification is
anarchistic: the natural right to. bear arms in self-defense is returned
119 The scope of the Fourth Amendment, for example, is determined by reference
to individuals' privacy interests. See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646,
654-57 (1995).
120 This is comparable to the difficulty that courts have found determining the
scope of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. See Green, Paradox, supra note 117, at 149-56.
121 See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
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to individuals because they have escaped from the authority of the
state. They are in the state of nature.
1.

The Government Has Failed to Provide Sufficient Personal
Security

Under one example of this justification, we have returned to the
state of nature because the government is not providing us with sufficient personal security. The inadequacy of police protection returns
to us our natural right to bear arms, whether or not a system of private
arms possession makes us safer.
This justification is easily confused with the first, which appeals to
the public safety benefits of private arms possession. When we imagine the government failing to satisfY its obligations to protect citizens
from violence-that is, a situation in which the fifth justification is
applicable-we are likely imagining a scenario in which it is incompetent at disarming criminals. If so, the first justification might also
apply: since criminals are armed, the primary effect of a policy of disarmament might be a decrease in the use of arms in justified selfdefense.
But the two justifications are distinguishable. Assume that the
government is meeting its obligation to provide a minimal level of
security from violence, for example, because a policeman is stationed
on every block. If so, the fifth justification cannot apply. But if the
government is nevertheless incompetent at disarming criminals, the
first justification might still apply. These relatively well-protected citizens might be made still safer by private arms possession, and this fact
might put disarmament beyond the government's authority.
Conversely, assume that the first justification does not apply. Private arms possession does not make people safer. Indeed, let us imagine that the government has successfully disarmed the entire
population, including criminals, and it cannot allow the law-abiding
access to guns without too many criminals rearming themselves as
well. But in other respects the government is doing a bad job of protecting citizens from violence. Unarmed criminals (or criminals
armed with knives) roam at will. If this is the case, the fifth justification could still apply. The government's violation of citizens' fundamental interest in a minimal level of security from violence might
return to them their natural right to bear arms.
To be sure, it need not follow from the fact that the government
is failing to abide by one of its obligations that citizens enter the state
of nature entirely and regain all of their natural rights. It does not
follow from the fact that the government has violated one's right to
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free speech, for example, that one can refuse to abide by its resolution
of an unrelated contract dispute. 122 But it certainly seems possible
that the government's failure to abide by its obligation to provide sufficient personal security would return to citizens their natural right to
bear arms. Mter all, the government's failure to protect citizens from
violence returns to them some of their executive right. They may
engage in acts that would normally be reserved for the police alone.
And the right to bear arms, as we have seen, is tied to this executive
right.
It might appear odd that the fact that citizens are vulnerable to
violence would give them the right to something that would make the
level of violence even worse. Keep in mind, however, that we are
assuming that the choice to arm dominates, in the sense that it makes
one safer compared to a fixed population. The government seeks to
disarm the population because it has concluded that when everyone
makes this choice, we are all less safe. By abiding by the law compelling disarmament, therefore, one is disadvantaging oneself in order to
contribute to the creation of a public good. And it is arguable that
one would no longer have an obligation to contribute if the government is failing to provide a minimal level of security. In such situations one may choose the dominant strategy. Every man, as they say,
for himself.
Whether those who reject consent theories of the state would
come to the same conclusion is less certain. To be sure, they too
would likely understand the government as obligated to provide citizens with a minimal level of security from violence. Furthermore, if
the government failed to meet this obligation, citizens would surely be
permitted to take protection into their own hands to some extent.
But it is more questionable whether they would also be freed of their
obligation to obey laws disarming the population (assuming, as we
are, that such laws make the population safer). A natural duty of
political obedience-a duty independent of our consent-is arguably
tied to an obligation to participate in the creation of public goods. 123
Let us assume, however, that the violation of our fundamental
interest in security does allow us to bear arms. The fifth justification
still suffers from its anarchistic premises. If one is worried that the
122 What we need is a theory regarding which natural rights are returned to individuals when the government fails to satisfY some of its obligations, an issue which
Locke does not adequately explore. This question would presumably have to be
answered by reference to one's obligations in the state of nature when another party
to an agreement has committed a limited breach.
123 See joHN RAWLS, Legal Obligation and the Duty of Fair Play, reprinted in jOHN
RAWLS 117, 121-28 (Samuel Freeman ed., 1999).
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government will be unwilling to spend the resources necessary to provide its citizens with a minimal level of security from violence, the solution would apparently not be a constitutional right to bear arms, but a
constitutional right to police protection.
But perhaps the government can anticipate that it will be unable
to provide citizens with the requisite level of protection. The court of
appeals in Heller suggested that this might have been true of the
United States at the time of the Founding: "[M] ost Americans lacked
a professional police force until the middle of the nineteenth century
and ... many Americans lived in backcountry such as the Northwest
Territory." 124 The Founders, recognizing that these citizens were in
the state of nature to an extent, might have concluded that they
regained their natural right to bear arms. 125
Notice that the Founders could have concluded that these citizens were in the state of nature only in some respects. Indeed, it is
unlikely that they would consider these citizens to be in the state of
nature as far as the adjudication of rights violations was concerned,
since they must have thought they were offering citizens adequate
lawmakers and courts. 126 Once a citizen apprehended a suspected
violator of the law, he would be obligated to turn the suspect over to
the government to try and punish.
But they might have concluded that citizens were in the state of
nature concerning many of the activities now provided by a police
force. In particular, citizens would have to rely on themselves for protection against lawless violence and for apprehending suspected violators of the law. Since they were in the state of nature in these areas,
they might regain their natural right to bear arms.
It is worth emphasizing once again that under this justification
the right to bear arms is not a limit on governmental authority. A
government may permissibly disarm its citizens if it is providing sufficient police protection. And one problem with the fifth justification is
that our current government appears to be providing such protection.
No one currently lives in conditions similar to the backcountry at the
time of the Founding. Although police protection is not what we
124 Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 383 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (citation
omitted).
125 Of course, the fact that individuals in the backcountry are without police protection might also suggest that the first justification applies. Under such circumstances, the government could not credibly claim to be able to disarm criminals. For
this reason, a system of disarmament might make the public less safe, because its
effect would primarily be on the law-abiding.
126

See U.S. CaNST. arts. I, III.
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might hope it would be, it is hard to argue that it is so inadequate that
we have returned to the state of nature.
Another problem with the fifth justification is the scope of the
Second Amendment. If the government's failure to provide sufficient
security returns to individuals their entire right to bear arms, the Second Amendment would protect machine guns. Furthermore, the
Amendment would appear to extend beyond arms possession to other
rights that would be possessed by those in the backcountry at the time
of the Founding, such as the right to identify and detain suspected
violators of the law (provided that these suspects were turned over for
adjudication to the government). The Second Amendment would
protect a right to form a posse.
2.

State-of-Nature Pockets

Another less plausible version of the fifth justification does not
assume that the government is doing a bad job providing security. It
is instead based on the idea that we are released from the authority of
the government when faced with imminent violence-that is, in circumstances where we are threatened and the government cannot
come to our aid. No matter how many resources are devoted to law
enforcement, such situations will arise. Since imminent violence
releases us from governmental authority, we regain our natural right
to bear arms.
The argument, once again, is not that we have a right to bear
arms because they make us safer in these state-of-nature pockets. A
system of private arms possession, we can assume, makes us less safe by
increasing the likelihood that aggressors will be armed. Rather, we
have a right to bear arms-with any reduction in safety that resultsbecause we return to the state of nature when faced with imminent
violence.
Many Second Amendment advocates appear to endorse this theory given the frequency with which they quote the following passage
from Locke's Second Treatise:
Thus a thief, whom I cannot harm, but by appeal to the law, for
having stolen all that I am worth, I may kill when he sets on me to
rob me but of my horse or coat, because the law, which was made
for my preservation, where it cannot interpose to secure my life
from present force, which if lost is capable of no reparation, permits
me my own defence and the right of war, a liberty to kill the aggressor, because the aggressor allows not time to appeal to our common
judge, nor the decision of the law, for remedy in a case where the
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mischief may be irreparable. Want of a common judge with authority puts all men in a state of Nature .... 127

Since, they argue, we are in the state of nature in such cases, the government cannot forbid us from bearing arms for our defense. 128
One problem with this justification is that the mere fact that citizens might find themselves in a state-of-nature pocket does not mean
that the government is obligated to allow them to bear arms now,
when they are not in a pocket. They might have a right to bear arms
within the pocket-a right that would allow them, like MacGyver, to
fashion arms on the spot to deal with the threat. But it is unclear why
the government has to provide them with a right to bear arms in anticipation that they might find themselves in a pocket. 1 2 9
More fundamentally, Locke was wrong to conclude that citizens
confronted with imminent violence return to the state of nature.
Locke came to this conclusion because they were apparently able to
exercise the executive right that they had alienated upon entering
into the social contract. They could take the enforcement of their
rights into their own hands. This made it look as if they had returned
to the state of nature. But individuals have a right to self-defense
when confronted with imminent violence, not because the government has lost authority over them in these cases, but because if the
government wishes to retain its authority over them, it must allow
them to engage in certain acts of self-defense.
As we have seen, there are plausible arguments that the government must allow individuals to engage in self-defense in cases of imminent violence. One reason is excuse. Because we would engage in
self-defense even if it were prohibited, we may not permissibly be punished by the government for defending ourselves. 130 Another is that
laws permitting self-defense manifestly promote public safety. 131 But
these arguments do not presume that individuals reenter the state of
nature in cases of imminent violence and so regain all or some of
their natural rights. They merely claim that certain acts of selfdefense must be permitted by the government if it is to remain within
its authority. This is no different from other arguments that the gov127 LocKE, supra note 23, § 19, at 16-17.
128 See, e.g., David C. Savino, Self-Defense and the Right to Bear Arms: A Historical
Examination and Analysis of These Populist Rights (May 3, 1999), http:/ /www.talon
site.com/armory/ Articles%5CpapSelfDefense_and.htm; Gary A. Shade, The Right to
Keep and Bear Arms: The Legacy of Republicanism vs. Absolutism Qan. 10, 1993),
http:/ /www.firearmsandliberty.com/militia_.htm.
129 See Heyman, supra note 101, at 245-46.
130 See supra Part LB.
131 See supra Part I.A.2.
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ernment must respect citizens' fundamental interests. No one would
claim, for example, that individuals are in the state of nature when
speaking simply because the government must respect their fundamental interest in free speech.
Indeed, Locke could not have really believed that one reenters
the state of nature when confronted with imminent violence, for he
insisted that self-defense may be "regulated by laws made by the society."132 The fact that Locke thought that the government may apply
its laws to someone confronted with imminent violence and adjudicate after the event whether his actions conformed to those laws is
incompatible with the belief that these situations occur in the state of
nature.
II.

JusTIFICATIONS BASED ON REvoLUTION AGAINST

TYRANNY

Up to this point we have considered arguments for the Second
Amendment, of various degrees of plausibility, that look to the use of
arms in personal self-defense. That the Second Amendment protects
bearing arms for this purpose was essential to Scalia's opinion in Heller.133 But he also acknowledged that the Founders contemplated that
private arms possession would be beneficial because an armed citizenry can rise up against a tyrant. 134 The sixth through the eighth
justifications concern this idea.

A.

Discouraging Tyrannical Minorities

Under the previous five justifications, the Second Amendment
protects an interest that individuals have against the majority. Under
the sixth justification, in contrast, the Second Amendment protects
the will of the majority, by increasing its power to revolt if a tyrannical
minority should arise. 135 In a sense, this justification treats the Second
Amendment as a "collective," not an "individual," right. To be sure,
the Second Amendment does not protect state governments' interest
in arming organized militias. It gives each person a right to bear
arms. But the right is collective in the sense that it exists to protect
132 See LocKE, supra note 23, § 129, at 71.
133 See District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2817-22 (2008).
134 See id. at 2806-07.
135 AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL or RIGHTS 47-49 (1998); Levinson, supra note 4,
at 649; Brent]. Mcintosh, The Revolutionary Second Amendment, 51 ALA. L. REv. 673,
679-81 (2000); Jacob G. Hornberger, The Future of Freedom Found., The Revolutionary Second Amendment Quly 2000), http:/ /www.fff.org/freedom/0700a.asp
("[T]he right to bear arms protected by the Second Amendment is the best insurance
policy that the American people could have against tyranny.").
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the majority's power, rather than to protect interests that individuals
have against the majority. The Second Amendment is like the right to
vote, protecting and enabling democracy, rather than limiting the
power of democratic institutions. 136
The sixth justification is able to explain the feeling that private
arms possession has value even if it increases violence. Security
against tyranny may be worth that cost. But is it able to generate a
story about why this value should be constitutionally protected? H private arms possession is in the majority's interest, why protect it with a
countermajoritarian constitutional right, that is, a right that is able to
strike down democratically enacted legislation? That the Fourth and
Eighth Amendments should be countermajoritarian in their legal
effect makes sense, given that they protect interests that individuals
have against the majority, and we have reason to believe that the
majority might sacrifice these interests improperly. But if the Second
Amendment is meant to benefit the majority, why should it constrain
the majority's will? If the majority wants to sacrifice its own interests
by disarming the population, why shouldn't it be able to?
One possibility is that the majority's authority is limited by an
obligation not to create an excessive risk of losing its power to a tyrant.
If so, the Second Amendment would enforce this limit against the
temptations that the majority would have to disarm the population in
the interest of public safety.
The idea that it is beyond the majority's authority to endanger its
own power is not inconceivable. Locke, however, appeared to believe
that there were no limits on the type of government to which the
majority can entrust its authority. 137 It could entrust its powers to a
136 To say that the right to vote exists to protect democracy does not mean that
one cannot also understand it as protecting individuals' autonomy interests in political participation. See Adam Winkler, Note, Expressive Voting, 68 N.Y.U. L. REv. 330,
336 n.24 (1993).
Under some interpretations, the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment
protects democracy as well. To be sure, some understand the Clause as protecting
individuals' autonomy interest in expressing their ideas, an interest that they possess
against the majority. See, e.g., Richards, Obscenity Law, supra note 50, at 61-67; Richards, Toleration, supra note 50, at 331, 334. But some see the Clause as preventing a
captured government from subverting the will of the majority by limiting the information available to voters. The Clause addresses this problem by allowing citizens to
expose the government's misdeeds and by giving voters the information they need to
come to informed decisions. See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, PoLITICAL FREEDOM 54-60
(Greenwood Press 1979); Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory,
1977 AM. B. FouND. REs. J. 521, 554-67.
137 Provided that the government does not violate the reserved rights of
individuals.
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monarchy, 138 for example, even though he recognized that, in so
doing, the majority exposed itself to a serious risk of tyranny. 139 It
would appear, therefore, that for Locke the majority is free to accept
the risk of tyranny that results from a disarmed population.
But even if the choice to disarm is within the majority's authority,
the Second Amendment could be understood as an act of prudential
self-limitation on the majority's part. Because private arms possession
makes us more vulnerable to violence, at some time in the future the
majority may imprudently disarm the population, wrongly privileging
public safety over protection against tyranny. The Second Amendment helps keep this from happening.
Another possibility is that the Second Amendment exists not to
keep the majority from making imprudent sacrifices, but to keep a
nascent tyrant-acting through a captured legislature-from disarming the population in order to secure his power. 140 Indeed, since the
passage of laws disarming the population could be a sign that capture
is occurring, the Second Amendment might also play an evidentiary
role. The violation of Second Amendment rights will indicate to the
majority that it needs to exercise greater control over the government.
In addition to being able to generate a plausible story about why
the value of private arms possession would need to be protected by a
constitutional right, the empirical premises standing behind the sixth
justification are relatively plausible and stable. 141 The relationship
between an armed population and a successful popular revolution is
fairly straightforward. Since the tyrannical government will be armed,
allowing private arms possession clearly increases the power of the
majority compared to the government and makes the majority better
138 LocKE, supra note 23, §§ 132-33, at 72-73; see also RuTH W. GRANT, joHN
LocKE's LIBERALISM 117-19 (1987) ("[In Locke's view] the majority ... may decide
that fewer than a majority, even one man and his heirs forever, will rule that community."); THoMAS, supra note 80, at 27 (stating that in Locke's view, constitutional monarchy is an acceptable form of government to which the people can entrust power).
139 See LocKE, supra note 23, § 94, at 53-54.
140 See Stephen Holmes, Precommitment and the Paradox of Democracy, in CoNSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY 195, 230-38 Qon Elster & Rune Slagstad eds., 1988).
141 This is not to say that its empirical premises cannot be criticized. One might
argue, for example, that if a tyrant does arise, small arms of the sort that would be
allowed under any acceptable reading of the scope of the Amendment would provide
insufficient powers of resistance (although they would surely increase the cost of tyranny to some extent ) . See, e.g., Wendy Brown, Guns, Cowboys, Philadelphia Mayors, and
Civic Republicanism: On Sanford Levinson's The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99
YALE LJ. 661, 665 (1989). One could also argue that the likelihood that a tyrannical
regime will arise is too small to justify the costs of widespread arms possession. See
Bellesiles, supra note 103, at 250.
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able to enforce its will. Furthermore, this fact does not depend significantly on the current legal regulation of arms. One problem with the
first justification, it will be remembered, was that if private arms possession made us safer, it was only in the context of a particular legal
system that was largely effective (or utterly ineffective) at keeping
arms out of the hands of criminals. 142 But arms can discourage tyranny no matter how they are legally regulated, provided that they are
in the hands of a sufficiently large number of people. Legal regulation is irrelevant to this beneficial effect because the use of arms to
overthrow tyranny occurs outside of the legal system, during a
revolution.
But under the sixth justification, the Second Amendment's scope
would be determined by the majority's interest in avoiding tyranny.
And this would make it much narrower than most Second Amendment advocates would wish. 143 Apparently only three acts would be
protected: (1) ownership of arms (such that they will be available in
the event of a revolution); (2) sufficient practice with them to make
one reasonably effective should a revolution arise; and (3) use of arms
in an actual revolution against a tyrant. 144
Most significantly, under the sixth justification, the use of arms
for private self-defense would not be protected. For this reason, the
law requiring all firearms to be trigger-locked, which was struck down
in Heller, would be constitutional. There is nothing about such a law
that would keep us from unlocking our guns in the event of a revolution. Furthermore, since the law in Heller allowed guns to be used for
"lawful recreational purposes," 145 citizens would be able to develop
sufficient facility with them to be effective revolutionaries.
Scalia recognized the possibility of "a sort of middle position,
whereby citizens were permitted to carry arms openly, unconnected
with any service in a formal militia, but were given the right to use
them only for the military purpose of banding together to oppose tyranny."146 But, in addition to rejecting this reading of the Second
142 See supra Part I.A.l.
143 CJ. Akhil Reed Amar, Foreword: The Document and the Doctrine, 114 HARv. L. REv.
26, 126-29 (2000) (arguing that the Second Amendment refers to a collective right of
the people to render military service and that nothing in the Amendment prohibits
the kinds of "reasonable gun control measures now on the national agenda").
144 Furthermore, a court is unlikely to find that an individual is engaged in the
third type of act, since that would mean admitting that the government of the United
States is tyrannical.
145 D.C. CoDE§ 7-2507.02 (2001), invalidated by District of Columbia v. Heller, 128
S. Ct. 2783 (2008).
146 Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2809.
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Amendment as "odd," he noted that that it was not one offered by the
District of Columbia, which insisted that the Second Amendment
extended only to the use of arms in an organized state militia. 147
(One wonders whether the District would have had greater success if
it had argued for this middle position.)
Which weapons would be protected under the sixth justification
is uncertain. As we have seen, Scalia answered this question through
the Miller test, which gives individuals a constitutionally protected
interest only in arms "typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for
lawful purposes." 148 Although this excludes machine guns, it also
divorces the scope of the Second Amendment from its underlying
purposes. Mter all, machine guns would be useful in a revolution
against a tyrannical regime, since the tyrant is likely to employ
machine guns himself. A more principled solution to this problem
would be to accept that individuals have a Second Amendment interest in possessing machine guns, but to uphold laws prohibiting their
possession through an application of the standard of review.
It is worth noting that in certain respects the sixth justification
could put greater burdens on the government, for it might have an
affirmative obligation to create the conditions for individuals to join
together as a popular armed force. This is similar to the difference
between a right to vote and a right to express one's views about the
government. In one sense the right to vote is stronger, for it puts an
obligation on the government to hold elections. The government has
not respected this right simply by not interfering when people express
their views about who should run the government. But the fact
remains that under the sixth justification the Second Amendment
would be weaker in a way that is unsatisfactory to Scalia and most Second Amendment advocates, in not protecting individuals' interest in
the private use of arms for self-defense. 149
B.

Discouraging Tyrannical Majorities

Sometimes Second Amendment advocates argue not that an
armed citizenry helps protect the majority against a tyrannical minority, but that it helps ensure that the majority will respect the funda147 /d.
148 /d.at2816.
149 See Brannon P. Denning, Gun Shy: The Second Amendment As an "Underenforced
Constitutional Norm, "21 HARv. J.L. & Pus. PoL'Y 719, 730 (1998); Lund, supra note 4,
at 31 n.72.
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mental rights of individuals or minorities. 150 This theory does not
assume that arms possession is justified because the majority is actually
violating the limits on its authority. Private arms possession is valuable
because it makes the violation of these limits less likely. This point is
important because there is an independent argument for a right to
bear arms if the government is actually violating fundamental rights.
According to that argument, for example, Jews in Nazi Germany,
unlike German citizens whose fundamental interests were respected,
would have a right to bear arms-although not one that would likely
have been recognized by the Nazi government. We shall explore such
an argument later. Our current theory, in contrast, is that citizens
should be allowed arms, even though their fundamental rights are not
actually being violated, because arms make it less likely that their fundamental rights will be violated.
Those who offer such arguments do not always make it clear
whether arms possession is itself a fundamental right of individuals. It
would be a fundamental right only if individuals do not merely have
primary fundamental rights, but also a secondary fundamental right
to a certain level of protection against the risk of governmental violations of their primary rights. But it is unclear that there is such a right
or that it would be strong enough to demand, not merely constitutional rights (like the Fourth or Eighth Amendment) that directly protect primary fundamental rights, but also a constitutional right to
arms possession as a further inducement to the majority to respect
primary rights. 151
Like the sixth justification, the seventh is able to explain why private arms possession is valuable even if public safety is decreased.
Encouraging the majority to stay within the limits of its authority may
be worth an increase in gun violence between citizens. But the seventh justification has weaknesses to which the sixth is not subject.
One problem is that it is not clear that arming the population
would make an individual better off when faced with a hostile major150 See, e.g., Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, The Second Amendment:
Toward an Afro-Americanist Reconsideration, 80 GEO. LJ. 309, 349-58 (1991); Daniel D.
Polsby & Don B. Kates, Jr., Of Holocausts and Gun Control, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 1237
(1997).
151 Even if there is no fundamental right to private arms possession, the countermajoritarian legal effect of the Second Amendment could be explained as a strategy
of precommitment on the part of the majority. Because private arms possession
increases the level and cost of violence between citizens, the majority \viii be inclined
to disarm the population, even though this will increase its own tendency to violate
the fundamental rights of individuals and minorities. The Second Amendment keeps
the majority from making this imprudent choice.
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ity. It is true that his powers of resistance against the government
would be strengthened. An armed individual has greater powers of
resistance against an armed government than an unarmed individual
does. But since we are assuming that the government is acting with
the blessing of the majority, arming the population will create a new
oppressor-an armed majority of private citizens. 152
1.

Will Allowing Individuals to Vindicate Their Visions of Reserved
Rights Make It More Likely That Reserved Rights Are
Respected?

The seventh justification is suspect for another reason. There is
no assurance that when an individual uses arms to resist the majority
his resistance is justified. Arming him allows him to resist the majority
even when no fundamental right has in fact been violated. The seventh justification appears to presume that allowing individuals to use
arms to enforce their vision of the limits of the majority's authority
will increase the likelihood that the actual limits will be respected.
This presumption is not merely questionable, it is also contrary to
a core intuition of Lockean political theory (a serious problem to the
extent that we are relying on such a theory to justify the Second
Amendment). Individuals are motivated to join the social contract
because of the "inconveniences" of the state of nature. 153 Because we
are fallible judges about whether natural rights have been violatedand particularly because we tend to interpret our own rights and the
rights of our kin too broadly154-we can make mistakes, particularly in
our application of the principles of natural law to the facts. 155 As a
result, the state of nature can devolve into a state of war.
If this Lockean intuition is correct, an individual's views about the
limits of the majority's authority would also be biased in his favor.
There is no reason, therefore, to assume that empowering the individ152 See Carl T. Bogus, Race, Riots, and Guns, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 1365, 1373-74
( 1993); David C. Williams, Constitutional Tales of Violence: Populists, Outgroups, and the
Multicultural Landscape of the Second Amendment, 74 TuL. L. REv. 387, 463 (1999)
("[Minorities] should ... fear a regime of decentralized violence because they are
relatively weak and powerless; they do not have as many guns as their enemies.").
153 LocKE, supra note 23, §§ 124-27, at 70-71.
154 !d. § 13, at 13, § 125, at 70.
155 !d. § 124, at 70 ("[T]hough the law of Nature be plain and intelligible to all
rational creatures, yet men, being biased by their interest, as well as ignorant for want
of study of it, are not apt to allow of it as a law binding to them in the application of it
to their particular cases."); see also id. § 136, at 76 (" [T] he law of Nature being unwritten, and so nowhere to be found but in the minds of men ... who, through passion or
interest, shall miscite or misapply it .... ").
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ual to enforce his views about the limits of the majority's authority will
make it more likely that the actual limits will be respected. Indeed,
because an individual's views will be biased in his favor, his views will
diverge from other individuals' just as much as they will diverge from
the m~ority's. Some individuals may think that a graduated income
tax is outside the government's authority. Others may think a flat tax
is. Empowering individuals to enforce their diverging views about the
limits of governmental authority will simply recreate the chaos of the
state of nature.
What is more, if the assumption of the seventh justification were
correct, there would apparently be no reason for individuals to leave
the state of nature and enter into the social contract in the first place.
The problem with the state of nature is that individuals are empowered to enforce their diverging views about natural rights, resulting in
feuding. If their views are likely to be correct, they will not diverge.
Our skepticism about the seventh justification is supported by
Locke's own statements about individuals' resistance against a majority that they believe has violated their reserved rights. Locke accepted
that individuals whose reserved rights are actually violated by the
majority have a right of resistance. 156 They return to the state of
nature and may exercise their natural right to defend their rights. He
was sensitive, however, to the problem of individuals wrongly resisting
the m~ority or its government. But he argued that the general recognition of a right of individual resistance will not create serious disorder, since aggrieved individuals (whose resistance may or may not be
justified) cannot overcome the coercive power of the majority as a
whole. 157 Implicit in this argument, however, is the recognition that
giving individuals greater powers of resistance by arming them could
156 At times Locke suggests that an individual may not legitimately resist the government at all. See id. §§ 87-88, at 49-50. Only the majority as a whole can. See id.
§ 149, at 82-83, § 240, at 131, § 243, at 132; see also SIMMONS, supra note 36, at 172-74
("The standard reading of the text seems to be that Locke's right of resistance can be
held only by the body of people, its proper exercise to be determined only by the
majority of the body politic."); THoMAS, supra note 80, at 70 (noting that according to
Locke, "no one has a right to resist unless this single instance [of an individual's rights
being violated] has persuaded the majority to withdraw its consent"). But Locke's
considered view appears to be that individuals may engage in legitimate resistance
even against a majority: "And where the body of the people, Many single man, are
deprived of their right, or are under the exercise of a power without right, having no
appeal on earth they have a liberty to appeal to Heaven, whenever they judge the
cause of sufficient moment." LocKE, supra note 23, § 168, at 93 (emphasis added); see
SIMMONS, supra note 36, at 174-77.
157 See LocKE, supra note 23, § 208, at 112-13, § 230, at 123-24.
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create serious disorder, with no increased chance that reserved rights
will actually be respected. 158
2.

Blackstone on Auxiliary Rights

The seventh justification appears to be supported by a frequently
cited passage from William Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of
England, where he described the right to bear arms as an "auxiliary
right," that is, a "barrier[ ] to protect and maintain inviolate ... primary rights." 159 But any reliance on Blackstone for the seventh justification is misplaced, because he rejected the very idea of individual
resistance to a majoritarian government. 16° For Blackstone, anyone
who entered into the social contract (and so accepted the authority of
the majority) was bound by its decisions. The majority's will, as
expressed in the legislature, had an "absolute despotic power." 161 The
only legitimate resistance to the government is by a majority as a
whole. 162 Blackstone came to this conclusion precisely because of
worries about the consequences of recognizing broader rights of individual resistance.
158 Locke may also have thought individual rights of resistance would not result in
anarchy because disputes about the limits of the majority's authority would be far less
frequent than were disputes about rights in the state of nature. Individuals are motivated to enter into the social contract because of uncertainty about the scope of natural rights. This means that the social contract can be effective only if it is easier to
determine one's rights and duties after having entered into the contract. A condition
for the social contract, therefore, is that any limits on the authority of the majority
must be matters of general (although not absolutely universal) agreement. And that
suggests that the state of nature will not be reintroduced if individuals have rights of
resistance. For there will be less disagreement about such matters than there were in
the state of nature.
This does not support the seventh justification, however. First of all, if the limits
of the authority of the majority are something about which there is generally agreement, the probability that the majority will fail to recognize these limits is lowered,
making an armed citizenry less necessary. Second, even if disagreement about
reserved rights is less frequent than disagreement about rights in the state of nature,
the fact remains that when there is disagreement, there is no reason to believe that an
individual's views will not be biased in his favor. As a result, there is still no good
argument for empowering him to enforce this vision by giving him arms.
159 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 8, at*l41, *143; seealso]ovcE LEE MALcoLM, To KEEP
AND BEAR ARMs 130 (1994) ("Blackstone's comments on [the need for citizens to be
armed] are of the utmost importance since his work immediately became the great
authority on English common law in both England and America."); Cottrol & Diamond, supra note 150, at 322-23; Mcintosh, supra note 135, at 690.
160 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 8, at *251.
161 See id. at *260.
162 See id. at *244.
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To be sure, Blackstone spoke of personal security, personal liberty, and private property as "absolute" constitutional rights, which
suggests that he believed that the majority's authority is limited. 163
But he rejected the idea that violations of an individual's life, liberty,
or property allow her to resist the majority. Unlike Locke, Blackstone
worried that giving "every individual the right of ... employing private
force to resist even private oppression" would be "productive of anarchy."164 Since he denied that individuals have rights against the
majority, he could not have believed that private arms possession was a
means of protecting such rights. 165 He must have understood the
right to bear arms as facilitating majoritarian revolutions, along the
lines envisioned by the sixth justification.
Of course, one need not accept Blackstone's conclusion that the
majority has no limits on its authority. One can accept that a
majoritarian government can act beyond its authority by violating
reserved rights of individuals. In such cases, they will be justified in
resisting, including by force of arms. But our question at this point is
not the rights of those whose reserved rights are violated (that, as we
shall see, is the eighth justification). Our question is which system is
best designed to ensure that these rights are not violated. And we
have as yet no good reason to think that empowering individuals to
enforce their diverging visions of their reserved rights will do the job.
But let us assume that the seventh justification is correct. The
scope of the Second Amendment would be limited by its purpose. Private arms possession would be protected only to the extent that it
enables individuals to defend the limits of governmental authority.
And this would make the scope of the Second Amendment very similar to its scope under the sixth justification. In particular, the class of
protected acts would include only: (1) private possession of certain
weapons, (2) practice sufficient to allow for facility in their use, and
(3) actual use when a reserved right is violated. A law that required all
guns to be trigger-locked, which was struck down in Heller, would
surely be constitutional, since nothing about that law keeps guns from
being unlocked in the event that reserved rights are violated.
C.

Anarchism

Rather than arguing, as the seventh justification does, that private
arms possession makes it less likely that the reserved rights of individu163 !d. at *129.
164 !d. at *251.
165 See Green, Paradox, supra note 117, at 128-32; Heyman, supra note 101, at
252-60.
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als will be violated, the eighth works on the assumption that these
rights are being violated by the government right now. One advantage of this justification is that it is conceivable that an individual
whose reserved rights are violated by the government has a right to
use arms when resisting the government, even when laws prohibiting
arms possession promote public safety. Had the government retained
its authority over her, it could compel her to disarm as a means of
reducing violence between citizens. But because the government has
violated her reserved rights (for example, in privacy, free expression,
or freedom of religious belief), she is no longer obligated to participate in the creation of this public good.
Notice it would not matter under the eighth justification-the
way it did under the seventh-that private arms possession is not a
good method of ensuring that reserved rights are respected. The
eighth justification does not give individuals arms because they make
it more likely that their reserved rights will be respected. It gives them
arms because their reserved rights have in fact been violated. It may
be true that when individuals are armed, disagreement about the
scope of our rights will simply recreate the conflict that existed in the
state of nature. But the point of the eighth justification is that citizens
are in the state of nature. The government has returned them to the
state of nature by violating their reserved rights. 166 The eighth justification, like the fifth, is anarchistic. Individuals regain their natural
right to bear arms, even though they might be worse off as a result,
because they stand outside the government's authority. But the
eighth justification, unlike the fifth, emphasizes individuals' natural
right to use arms in resistance against the government, rather than in
private self-defense.
It is questionable, however, that governmental violation of a
reserved right frees one of all obligations to the government, even
under a Lockean theory of governmental authority. Assume, for
example, that the government arbitrarily appropriates your property.
Locke believed that this would violate your reserved rights. 167 And he
166 To say that an individual has a right of armed resistance does not mean that he
can shoot government officials at will. Locke insists that even those in the state of
nature are subject to proportionality restrictions when their rights are violated. The
right to punish is not a right to act "according to the passionate heats or boundless
extravagancy of his own will, but only to retribute to him so far as calm reason and
conscience dictate, what is proportionate to his transgression." LocKE, supra note 23,
§ 8, at 10. The point is merely that, having returned to the state of nature, they would
no longer be subject to laws prohibiting arms possession, even if these laws help bring
about public safety.
167 !d. § 138, at 77-78.
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would certainly think that you would return to the state of nature with
respect to that governmental action, and so-to some extent-would
regain your executive right to defend your rights. You could resist the
appropriation. But would you reenter the state of nature entirely?
Could you, for example, refuse to respect the government's resolution
of an unrelated contract suit? 168 If you do remain bound by the contract judgment, you might also still be subject to a law, enacted by the
government for public safety reasons, that disarmed the population.
You could resist the appropriation of your property, but not by force
of arms.
But even if some violations of reserved rights would not allow one
to bear arms, it seems clear that violation of reserved rights could
eventually become so severe that one's resistance could be by force of
arms. Once again, this would be true despite the fact that disarmament makes us safer from violence at the hands of our fellow citizens.
This could be accepted even by those who reject consent theories
of political authority. Because they too take political authority to be
limited, they would surely consider violation of these limits to justifY
resistance to some extent. And when the violation becomes significant enough, it could presumably be by force of arms.
But because of its anarchistic premises, the eighth justification is
implausible. The government may indeed be illegitimate. But it is
unlikely that its illegitimacy would be accepted by those creating constitutional rights. 169 If the Founders were worried that the govern168 This question would presumably have to be answered by reference to your obligations in the state of nature when another party to an agreement has committed a
minor breach . Does the breach release you of all obligations under the agree ment or
can you still be bound to an extent?
169 I offer a n argument that a Lockea n would have to recognize that all citizens
are potentially in the state of nature in Green, Paradox, supra note 117, at 119-28,
168-73. My argument there considers who has authority to decide disagreements
between the majority and individuals about whether the majority is acting within its
authority. If the majority has the authority to decide such disagreements, then all
limits on its authority evaporate. For even if it did not have authority, it would nevertheless have authority if it decided it had authority. For this reason , I argued that an
individual can reenter the state of nature, and regain his right to bear arms, simply by
challenging the authority of the majority, eve n if the individual is in fact subject to the
social contract. Although at the time I found the argument persuasive, I admitted
that its anarchistic consequences made it more a reductio ad absurdum of Lockean
political theory than an argument for the Second Amendment.
I no longer believe, however, that an individual escapes the political authority of
the majority simply by challenging its authority. It is true that the individual and the
majority are in the state of nature with respect to the question of the majority 's authority.
But the majority is forced to recognize that they are in the state of nature only with
respect to that issue. It does not follow that it must give the individual all the rights
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ment will violate certain reserved rights, the proper response, surely,
would be to create constitutional rights protecting them-not constitutional rights that protect the powers individuals would have if those
reserved rights were violated.
Furthermore, the scope of the Amendment under the eighth justification would be absurdly broad. If it is really true that the government is acting outside its authority, why don't individuals have the
right to machine guns or nerve gas? Mter all, violation of reserved
rights could be imagined that would free individuals even of their
obligations to obey laws prohibiting these weapons.

III.

JusTIFICATIONS BASED ON HuNTING

There is a final justification to consider. Private arms possession
might be valuable because arms can be used in hunting, which is itself
valuable not merely because it provides food for one's family, but also
because it is an important form of recreation and the expression of a
particular conception of the good life. Scalia himself mentions this
possibility. 170
Once again, such a justification is able to explain why guns have
value despite associated social costs. Individuals' interest in hunting
might be worth protecting despite an increase in gun violence
between citizens. But the justification is unlikely to explain the intuitions of many Second Amendment advocates that it protects a fundamental interest that limits the authority of the government. For it is
difficult to see how it would be beyond the government's authority to
outlaw hunting entirely.
In any event, the scope of the Second Amendment under this
justification would be narrow. The protected weapons (rifles and the
like) and protected acts (hunting and practicing with arms sufficiently
to be an effective hunter) would be much narrower than most Second
Amendment advocates demand and would be insufficient to strike
down the laws at issue in Heller. 1 71
CoNCLUSION

My goal in this Article has been to identify nine possible justifications for constitutionally protecting private arms possession, as a foundation for principled reasoning about the Second Amendment.
he would have if he were in the state of nature. I hope to explore these questions,
with which I also struggled in Green, Last Stand, supra note 117, at 698-99, later. (I
am indebted to Matthew Adler for prodding me to reconsider my earlier argument.)
170 District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2810 (2008).
171 !d. at 2863 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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Discussions of the Amendment, by advocates and detractors alike,
have been insufficiently sensitive to the differences between these justifications. I'd like to end by briefly summing up how these justifications can illuminate Scalia's opinion in Heller and suggesting how they
might answer some unresolved questions of the Second Amendment's
scope.
In his opinion, Justice Scalia noted that one benefit of the Second Amendment contemplated by the Founders was that it allows citizens to "resist tyranny." 172 As we have seen, however, this justification
is ambiguous. We might understand the Second Amendment as giving to citizens the full natural right to bear arms that they would have
if the government actually were tyrannical. (This is the eighth justification.) On the other hand, the Second Amendment might protect private arms possession only to the extent that it makes tyranny less
likely. Furthermore, we might understand the tyranny that is discouraged as a minority that ignores the will of the majority (the sixth justification) or as a majority that violates the reserved rights of individuals
(the seventh justification). Since it is the most plausible of the three,
my guess is that Scalia (and the Founders) had something like the
sixth justification in mind.
In any event, if we seek to explain the decision in Heller, we cannot look to these three justifications, since they do not concern individuals' interest in using arms to defend themselves against fellow
citizens. 173 Although Scalia believed that protection against tyranny
was the reason for the creation of the Second Amendment, he argues
that the Amendment also protects the interest in the use of arms for
self-defense. 174
The justification from hunting (our ninth) need not detain us, of
course, since it too cannot justify the result in Heller. This leaves us
with the first five justifications. There is an important distinction here
between the first justification, which appeals to the public safety benefits of private arms possession, and the remaining four, which seek to
identify an autonomy interest in bearing arms that would exist even if
private arms possession made us less safe.
It is likely that Scalia, and the Founders, were not thinking of the
third justification, since it is very implausible. It is not clear that the
physically disadvantaged have any interest in the equalizing character
of arms possession, much less an interest that is strong enough to jus172
173
174

Id. at 2801 (majority opinion).
See supra Parts II.A-C, III.
Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2801.
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tify a constitutional right that could limit the government's ability to
protect citizens from armed violence. 175
The second justification is also implausible. This justification, it
will be remembered, seeks to tie the right to bear arms to the excuse
of self-defense. We should be excused for engaging in self-defense,
because the desire to defend ourselves in cases of imminent violence
is very strong-so strong that we would not be able to abide by a law
prohibiting self-defense. It is therefore beyond the authority of the
government to make self-defense illegal. But excuse cannot justify a
right to bear arms. Individuals simply do not have an impulse to bear
arms that is so strong that they could not abide by a law requiring
them to disarm. Excuse gives us no reason, therefore, to think that it
is not within the government's authority to disarm the population.
The failure of the second justification is important because Scalia
insisted that "the inherent right of self-defense [is] central to the Second Amendment right." 176 To the extent that the right to self-defense
is based on excuse, no connection between it and the right to bear
arms can be found.
That leaves us with the first, fourth, and fifth justifications. The
first justification grounds the Second Amendment in citizens' interest
in safety from violence, and it depends upon the empirical judgment
that a system of private arms possession makes them safer than a policy of disarmament. 177 But even if this judgment is true, the question
remains why the authority of the government is thereby limited. We
are commonly thought obligated to abide by governmental decisions
that are mistaken, even if the decisions make us less safe.
To be sure, a decision may be beyond the government's authority
if it manifestly fails to promote public safety or if it results in the government's failure to provide even the minimal level of security that is
every citizen's right. Indeed, a right of self-defense, different from the
right based on excuse, might be justified on just these grounds. A law
prohibiting self-defense would manifestly fail to promote public safety,
so much so that any citizen who abided by such a law would likely be
less safe than in the state of nature.
But one cannot use the same reasoning to justify a right to bear
arms. Even if it is true that disarmament makes people less safe, it is
not manifestly true. Reasonable people disagree on the matter. Nor is
there any reason to believe that a government that compromises its
citizens' safety through disarmament could not still provide them with
175
176
177

See supra Part I.C.
Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2817.
See supra Part I.A. I.
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the minimal level of safety that is their rightP 8 Once again, we have
failed to find the connection Scalia insists upon between the right to
bear arms and the right of self-defense.
In any event, if the first justification does stand behind the Second Amendment, the arguments for a strict scrutiny standard of
review and for incorporation into the Fourteenth Amendment would
likely be weak. Although the Second Amendment seeks to protect
individuals' powerful interest in safety, its strength cannot be identified with the strength of this interest. After all, those who seek to
disarm the population are largely motivated by a desire to protect this
same powerful interest. They believe that disarmament is the best ·
means of making people safe. According to the first justification, the
Second Amendment constitutionalizes the empirical judgment that
those who recommend disarmament are wrong. The strength of the
right to bear arms should be tied therefore to the strength of this
empirical judgment.
The more plausible justifications are the fourth and fifth. These
also see a connection between the right to bear arms and a right of
self-defense. But the relevant right of self-defense is the natural executive right-that is, the right that each person possesses in the state of
nature to enforce natural rights as she sees fit (and face the consequences if she is wrong). For the Lockean, individuals possess such a
right in the state of nature, even though their tendency to make mistakes results in feuding and an increase in natural rights violations.
A natural right to bear arms can be derived from this right of selfdefense, because arms allow us to more effectively exercise our executive right. Insofar as they seek to derive the right to bear arms from
the natural executive right, therefore, the fourth and fifth justifications can explain the connection that Scalia sees between the Second
Amendment and a natural right of self-defense.
The problem each must face, however, is that the very purpose of
governmental authority is to end individuals' power of private rights
enforcement. Just as one alienates the executive right upon entering
the social contract, so, it seems, one would alienate the natural right
to bear arms. We have as yet no explanation of why the natural right
to bear arms would limit the authority of the government.
The fifth justification solves this problem by arguing that the natural right to bear arms has been returned to us because the government has failed to abide by its obligation to provide us with sufficient
personal security. In short, the justification is anarchistic. The Sec178

See supra Part I.A.2.
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ond Amendment exists because the government recognizes that we
are (partially) in the state of nature.
One problem with the fifth justification is this anarchistic premise. Even if it was true at the time of the Founding that many citizens were within the state of nature, this is unlikely to be true now.
Furthermore, insofar as the fifth justification apparently returns to
individuals their entire natural right to bear arms, it would have problematic consequences for the Second Amendment's scope. Possession
of machine guns would be protected.
But if the fifth justification is correct, individuals' interests in
arms possession would probably be significant enough to justify incorporation into the Fourteenth Amendment. What is more, laws that
infringe upon Second Amendment interests would require strict scrutiny. Indeed, it is not clear why such laws would not simply be per se
invalid. Given that individuals have a right to bear arms because they
have escaped governmental authority, it is hard to see how the government could have any power to compromise this right, even if the governmental interest at issue were compelling and the law narrowly
tailored to serve this interest.
In the end, I find the fourth justification to be the most plausible
account of the right to bear arms identified by Scalia in Heller. This
justification does not assume that we have a natural right to bear arms
because we have escaped the authority of the government. Instead, it
argues that individuals retained part of the natural right to bear arms
upon entering into the social contract, out of respect for Lockean values of autonomy and individualism. The Second Amendment is like
those other limitations on governmental authority-such as participatory rights at trial-that protect part of the natural executive
right, while carefully delineating the reserved right's scope in order to
avoid a descent into the chaos of the state of nature.
One benefit of the fourth justification is that it can explain
Scalia's claim that the scope of the Second Amendment is limited to
arms "typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes."179 Under the fourth justification, the scope of the right to
bear arms depends upon symbolic considerations. In nations where
arms possession is uncommon, simply retaining the capacity to use
one's fists or a knife might be a sufficient expression of Lockean values. In the United States, however, guns take on an important expressive role. But this expressive role would not be played by arms, like
machine guns, that are not typically possessed.
179

Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2816.
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As a final matter, how might the fourth justification answer the
important questions of incorporation and the appropriate standard of
review? On the one hand, the analogy between the right to bear arms
and participatory rights at trial might argue in favor of incorporation
and a rigorous standard of review. My guess, however, is that since the
scope of the Second Amendment would substantially depend upon
symbolic considerations under the fourth justification, the arguments
for a strict scrutiny standard of review or for incorporation would be
weak.
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